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A Predictive Framework for the
Effectiveness of International
Criminal Tribunals
ABSTRACT

This Note examines international criminal tribunals and
analyzes the factors that can govern the level of their
effectiveness.
The historical background in this area is
essential, for one of the main points of the Note is that
international criminal tribunals cannot be detached from the
political circumstances that create them and enforce their
verdicts if those verdicts are to be enforceable at all.
The Note begins with an analysis of the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, and compares it to its
contemporary counterpart, the InternationalMilitary Tribunal
at Tokyo. The Note then makes a similaranalysis of the recent
InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia and
the InternationalCriminalTribunalfor Rwanda.
From the histories of these international criminal
tribunals, the Note develops a predictive framework for the
effectiveness of the newly-legislated permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC). The predictive frameworh is built on
several factors including: the degree of defeat among the losing
parties, the level of cooperation among the victorious allies,
popular approval of judicial procedures unacceptable under
most other circumstances,and the weight of the evidence.
The last part of the Note applies this predictive framework
to the new Rome Statute for the ICC. Though the ICC is a
cornerstone of the dream of a truly effective and politically
detached internationalcriminaljustice system, the experience of
internationalcriminal tribunals during the twentieth century
demonstrates that such courts are dependent on the unified
political will and military power of the alliance that supports
their creation and enforces their verdicts.
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INTRODUCTION

The creation of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC)1
by the 1998 Rome Conference brings hope that the precedents of
Nuremberg may be used to end impunity for gross violations of
human rights. 2 Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) called the new
permanent court "a wrecking ball" against the "rock of State
sovereignty" that usually shelters war criminals from prosecution. 3
The enforcement of international criminal law, however, depends
upon the unified political will and military power of the alliance that

1.
This Note will usually refer to the International Criminal Court as the
"ICC."
2.
See David J. Scheffer, Developments in International Criminal Law: The
United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12, 21 (1999);
Phyllis Hwang, Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the
InternationalCriminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 457, 457 (1998).
3.
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The Eleventh Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture:
The Changing Nature of the Laws of War, 156 MIL. L. REV. 30, 51 (1998).
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supports the international tribunal. 4 Without the power of coercion,
there is little or no enforcement. 5
While the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and
Tokyo 6 at the end of the Second World War established precedents for
the enforcement of international criminal law and human rights,
their success, in both trial results and public perception, was only
possible because of a combination of factors. These factors include:
the degree of defeat among the losing parties, the level of cooperation
among the victorious allies, popular approval of judicial procedures
unacceptable under most other circumstances, and the weight of the
evidence. 7 At Nuremberg, the United States, Britain, France, and
Russia mustered the fleeting reserves of allied cooperation to try the
leaders of Nazi Germany for war crimes. They succeeded in
convicting most of those prosecuted, exposing the moral bankruptcy
of Nazism, and establishing an international precedent that
aggressive war is a punishable crime. The level of success at
Nuremberg, however, has not been repeated since, not even at Tokyo
at the end of the same war.
This Note analyzes how international criminal tribunals succeed
and fail by examining first the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, and
then the current ICTY and International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR). From the histories of these international criminal
tribunals, this Note develops a predictive framework for the
effectiveness of the newly legislated ICC.
Part II of this Note is a brief history of modern international
criminal tribunals: Nuremberg, Tokyo, the ICTY, and the ICTR.
Part III analyzes the success and failures of international criminal
tribunals in light of historical and political factors and then develops
the factors into a predictive framework for the enforcement of
international criminal law. Part IV applies this predictive framework
to the new Rome Statute for a permanent ICC in order to analyze
8
when it might be most effective.

4.
Jonathan I. Charney, Editorial Comment: Progressin internatinalLaw?.
93 AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 455 (1999).

5.

Charles Madigan & Colin McMahon, A Slow. Painful Quest for Justice:

Autopsy of a War Crime Tribunal, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 7. 1999, at 1. The defense counsel
for Dusko Tadic before the ICTY, Michail Wiadimiroff, said that in a situation like
Bosnia "Ly]ou are not going to prosecute your own people." Id.
6.
Generally called in this Note the "Nuremberg Tribunal" and the 'Tokyo
Tribunal" respectively.
7.
TAYLOR, infra note 20, at 86.
8.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
No. A/CONF.183!9, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) rhereinafter Rome Statute].
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BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS

A. Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials
The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after the Second World War
established the modern precedents for international criminal liability
for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggressive
war. 9 By the judgment of the International Military Tribunal, eleven
Nazis were sentenced to death and seven to prison at Spandau.10
Three were acquitted. 11 In Tokyo, a military tribunal under a similar
charter delivered retribution upon several of the most prominent
Japanese. 12 Two former Japanese premiers, Baron Koki Hirota and
General Hideki Tojo, were hanged, as were five other Japanese
generals.13

The differences in the actions of the victorious Allied Powers in
Germany and Japan, however, illustrate some basic problems in
An
establishing and enforcing international criminal law.
international criminal tribunal is only as effective as the collective
political will and military power of the alliance that creates and
supports it because the nature of criminal law is coercive. 14 The
tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo can be distinguished by several
factors, including the relative powers and interests of the
participating nations and the structure of authority. 15 The Big Four
powers negotiated the creation of the Nuremberg tribunal at

9.
See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, annexed to the
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 286-88; ROBERT
JACKSON, THE NURNBERG CASE (1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. The crime of
aggressive war is called "crimes against the peace" in the Nuremberg and Tokyo
charters. See generally id.
10.
TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 602 (1992).
11.
Id. at 613. Those acquitted at Nuremberg then faced trials before German
courts. Hans Frische and Franz von Papen were convicted of other crimes and served
sentences; Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht was acquitted by the German
Denazification Court and lived to be ninety-two. Id.
12.
See ARNOLD BRACEMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS 381 (1987). Seven were sentenced to death, fifteen to
life in prison, and two for lesser terms. No one was acquitted. Id.
13.
Id.
See David J. Scheffer, Developments in International Criminal Law: The
14.
United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AN. J. INT'L L. 12, 21 (1999).
Scheffer describes how the final text of the Rome Statute includes the crime of
aggression, even though the conference had reached an impasse in trying to define it.
Id. As a result, the United States did not immediately or enthusiastically sign the
treaty. Id.
15.
BRACKIMAN, supra note 12, at 59-60.
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London. 16 The Tokyo tribunal, in contrast, was created by the
declaration of General Douglas MacArthur acting as Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers. 17 The judges sitting on the
Tribunal represented the eleven nations of the Far Eastern
Commission, but MacArthur retained authority to review
prosecutions and sentences.18
The literature on the Nuremberg trials is vast and will not
receive significant addition here, but it must be said that the
conditions which resulted in the establishment of the first modern
international criminal tribunal and its prosecution of twenty-one
former military and political leaders of one of the world's strongest
powers are not likely to occur again. 19 These conditions include: the
unconditional surrender of Germany, the poor prospects of escape, the
relatively balanced alliance of the three great world powers,
widespread international support and attention, and the Nazis' habit
20
of keeping meticulous records of their genocidal activities.
During the heat of the fighting, the Allies committed themselves
to obtaining the "unconditional surrender" of both Germany and
21
Japan, and in the case of Germany, the Allies achieved their goal.

16.
17.

TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 75.
BRACKMAN, supra note 12, at 60.

18.
See id. Those nations were Australia, New Zealand, Canada. the
Netherlands, France, Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and two
colonial territories on the brink of independence: India and the Philippines. Id. The
Allied Council for Japan that advised the Supreme Commander consisted, however, of
just four nations: Britain, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Most of the
occupation troops in Japan were Americans. Id.
19.
"In most of the recent wave of democratizations, the ancien regime has
negotiated itself out of power, usually insisting on amnesty as a precondition for its
quiet exit. In a few cases, like Greece and Romania, the authoritarian regime suddenly
collapsed, making trials or executions possible. But it is unusual to be able to impose
one's political will as the Allies did after World War II." Gary Jonathan Bass,
InternationalLaw: War Crimes and the Limits of Legalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2103.
2115 (1999) (reviewing MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVE..ESS:
FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998) and MARK OSIEL, XASS
ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW (1997)).
20.
TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE AJIY ON THE
NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAV No. 10. at 86 (1949).
21.
RAYMOND G. O'CONNOR, DIPLOMACY FOR VICTORY: FDR AND
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER (1971); RONALD H. SPECTOR, EAGLE AGAINsT THE SU .
THE AMERICAN WAR WITH JAPAN 222-23 (1985). The policy of unconditional surrender
was criticized during and after the war as an unwise interference with the possibility of
removing the war-like rulers of either nation by diplomacy. SPECTOR, supra at 222-23;
see also THOMAS PARRISH, ROOSEVELT AND MARSHALL: PARTNERS IN POLITICS AND
WAR 336-42 (1989). The origins of the policy, though complicated, are tied closely to
the failure of Western diplomacy to enforce the Versailles Treaty and contain German
and Japanese aggression. FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A RENDEZVOUS
WITH DESTINY 463-64 (1990). After the debacle at Munich and the fall of France and
the Philippines, Western credibility was so low that the slogan of "unconditional
surrender" became both a rallying cry and a renunciation of appeasement.
See
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Unconditional surrender meant that the Germans would place
themselves at the complete mercy of the victors; there would be no
negotiated terms. 22 Unconditional surrender is not the most common
way to end a war because few nations are so beaten and powerless as
to have no leverage at all to demand escape or immunity for the
surviving leaders, or some other concession. 23 When the Germans
surrendered unconditionally on May 7, 1945, however, the German
war machine was mostly destroyed and in disarray, Hitler was dead,
and the Red Army had taken Berlin by assault. 24 United States and

British forces controlled Western Europe from the Atlantic to the
Elbe River and sealed off any escape. 25 Having witnessed and
endured countless Nazi lies and atrocities, the Allies were of one
26
mind not to negotiate.
Therefore, the Germans surrendered unconditionally to a
delicately balanced international alliance. The "Big Four ' 2 7 in the
alliance disagreed fundamentally on postwar policy, but had
depended on each other throughout the war. The United Kingdom

ELLIOTT ROOSEVELT & JAMES BROUGH, A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY:
THE
ROOSEVELTS IN THE WHITE HOUSE 332-33 (1975).
22.
DAVID EISENHOWER, EISENHOWER: AT WAR, 1943-1945, at 797 (1986); John
L. Snell, What to Do with Germany?, in THE MEANING OF YALTA: BIG THREE
DIPLOMACY AND THE NEW BALANCE OF POWER 40-41 (John L. Snell, ed., 1956).
23.
In November 1918 the conditions of the Armistice included exile for the
German Kaiser and a promise by the Allies not to occupy the whole of Germany.
Secretary Lansing to the Imperial German Government, October 23, 1918, State
Department Archives, in THE DIPLOMACY OF WORLD POWER: THE UNITED STATES,
1889-1920 154-55 (Arthur S. Link & William M. Leary, Jr., eds., 1970).
24.
Hitler committed suicide in Berlin on April 30, 1945; by then the Russians
had stormed the Tiergarten and were only a block away from Hitler's bunker. JOHN
TOLAND, THE LAST 100 DAYS 529 (1965).
25.
EISENHOWER, supra note 22, at 794-805.

26.

General Eisenhower did not even face the Germans at his headquarters at

Rheims until they had been coldly received and instructed by his chief of staff, General
Bedell Smith. Eisenhower's words to the Germans were few and curt. EISENHOWER,

supra note 22, at 797-801.
27.
The "Big Four" of the London Charter and Nuremberg trials were the
United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France. Nuremberg
Charter, supra note 9, art. 1. The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet
Union functioned as the "Big Three." Id. art. 1. Their leaders for most of the war were
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin. DAVID MCCULLOUGH,
TRUMAN 345 (1992). Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, and Harry Truman became
President. During the Potsdam Conference that summer, Churchill was replaced as
British Prime Minister by Clement Atlee. Id. at 446. For a colorful description of the
Big Three at Potsdom, see id. at 409-12, 416-23. France, under de Gaulle's leadership
after its humiliating defeat in 1940 was assigned an occupation zone in Germany, and
thus became part of the "Big Four" of the German occupation and Nuremberg.
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 9, art. 1. During most of the years of wartime
cooperation, France had little weight in Allied affairs; General de Gaulle was not even
told the date of D-Day. Eisenhower, supra note 22, at 231. Sometimes, usually in
reference to Far Eastern affairs, the "Big Four" included China's Chiang Kai.shek
rather than France. SPECTOR, supranote 21, at 330.
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under Winston Churchill wished to remain an imperial and colonial
power. 28 Russia under Joseph Stalin wished to partition Germany,
establish hegemony in Eastern Europe, and sponsor communist
revolutions worldwide. 29 The United States under Franklin D.
Roosevelt wished to rebuild world order based on the democratic
principles of the Atlantic Charter and Woodrow Wilson's model of
collective security.30 The United States needed Britain and her
colonies as bases for projecting power.3 1 Britain and Russia depended
on U.S. lend-lease aid.3 2 France was defeated and humiliated in 1940
and had little strength in 1945, but the United States and the United

The British, to paraphrase Churchill. had not fought two world wars in
28.
order to dismember their empire, but the American ideals since President Wilson
presided over the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 were national "self-determination."
republican forms of government, and democracy. SPECTOR, supra note 21, at 352. For
this reason, British, and American policies in the Far East often clashed, both before
and after the Second World War. See id. In 1945 the British, as well as the Dutch and
the French, wished to renew their imperial presence in Asia; the Americans wished the
end of colonialism and the births of independent republics. See RANDALL B. WOODS &
HOWARD JONES, DAWNING OF THE COLD WAR: THE UNITED STATES' QUEST FOR ORDER
3-5 (1991).
See Protocol of Proceedings of the Crimea Conference, Feb. 11. 1945, arts.
29.
llI-IV, 3 Bevans 1013, available at 1945 WL 6738, at 5-8; Agreement Regarding Japan,
Feb. 11, 1945, 59 Stat. 1823, 3 Bevans 1022, available at 1945 WL 6737; see also C.L.
SUL BERGER, SUCH A PEACE: THE ROOTS AND ASHES OF YALTA 124-26, 158-61 (1982).
The Allied Powers had agreed upon the joint occupation of Germany at the Yalta
Conference in 1945. Protocol of Proceedings of the Crimea Conference, arts. IlI.IV,
supra. The Russians would occupy most of the lands east of the Elbe River.
MCCULLOUGH, supra note 27, at 450. Of the German lands west of the Elbe, the
British would have the northern sector, the French the central sector, and the
Americans the southern sector. Though a permanent partition was not intended,
Germany remained divided for forty-five years. EISENHOWER, supra note 22. at 652-53.
Stalin had no intent to allow the reunification of Germany or a pro-Western
government in Poland. SULZBERGER, supra at 86.87.
30.
The Atlantic Charter was signed by Roosevelt and Churchill aboard the
H.M.S. Prince of Wales in 1941. See THEODORE A. WILSON, THE FIRsT SU=,tIT.
ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL AT PLACENTIA BAY 1941 64 (1991). In it, the American and
British governments declared their commitment to the -freedom from fear and want."
THE ATLANTIC CHARTER xvii-xviii (Douglas Brinkley & David R. Facey.Crowther, eds.,
1994). "Collective security" was part of President Wilson's "Fourteen Points" for world
peace using an open and public League of Nations instead of secret diplomacy and
balance of power politics. WOODROW WILSON'S CASE FOR THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 5759 (Hamilton Foley ed., 1923).
See WILSON, supra note 30, at 64.
31.
The Lend-Lease Act provided "all aid short of war" for those fighting Nazi
32.
Germany, and later, Japan. Through lend-lease aid, the wealth and production of the
United States supported Britain and Russia with supplies of credit, food. fuel, and
munitions before and after Pearl Harbor and America's declaration of war. LEON'
MARTEL, LEND-LEASE, LOANS, AND THE COMING OF THE COLD WAR: A STUDY OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY 4-6 (1979).
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Kingdom considered the restoration of French power necessary as a
33
postwar counter-weight to Russia and Germany.
It was the German plan to try to break the Allied Powers by
exploiting the natural division between the democracies and the
communists. 3 4 After Hitler's suicide, German leaders preferred to
surrender to the United States and the United Kingdom,3 5 rather
than face the wrath of the Russians. 36 The United States and the
United Kingdom, for their part, refused to breach their alliance with
the Russians, and the German surrender was accepted at Rheims by
all the Allied governments, including the Russians.3 7 The various
armies cooperated in rounding up the leading Nazis, and while a few
Nazis committed suicide, escape was impossible for most because
almost every country in the world was at war with Germany and a
38
German passport was virtually worthless.
At the insistence of the United States and by the London
Agreement of August 8, 1945, the leading Nazis were to be tried by an
international military tribunal. 39 The British feared that such a
tribunal would provide the Germans with both an opportunity to
embarrass their captors and a forum for Nazi propaganda. 40 The
Russians would have preferred to dispatch their captives using

See generally WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE COLLAPSE OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC:
33.
AN INQUIRY INTO THE FALL OF FRANCE IN 1940 (1969); see also THEODORE H. WHITE,
FIRE IN THE ASHES: EUROPE IN MID-CENTURY 240 (1953).
34.
See WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH: A
HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY 1091-92 (1960).
35.
See JAMES LUCAS, LAST DAYS OF THE THIRD REICH: THE COLLAPSE OF NAZI
GERMANY, MAY 1945, 574-75 (1986). For this reason, the Germans, represented by
Field Marshall Alfred Jodl, traveled to the Reims, France to surrender at the military
headquarters of the Western allies. Id. General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied
Commander, avoided an insult to his Russian allies, if not also a breach of the alliance,
by having the Russian military attache assigned to his headquarters sign the
documents of surrender on behalf of his government. Id.; see also SHIRER, supra note
34, at 1138-39.
36.
The Russians, having endured the worst of Nazi brutality for four years,
committed innumerable atrocities as they advanced across Germany in 1945. They
were the sort of atrocities that would now fall under the ICC Statute. MCCULLOUGH,
supra note 27, at 407-08.
37.
LUCAS, supra note 35, at 574.
38.
Joseph Goebbels was perhaps the most famous Nazi to evade capture by
suicide. SHIRER, supra note 34, at 1136. He and his wife committed suicide after
poisoning their children. Id. Heinrich Himmler, head of the Gestapo, also committed
suicide. Id. at 1141. Hermann Goering committed suicide in his cell the night before
his scheduled execution. BRACKMAN, supra note 12, at 226-27. Adolf Eichmann and
Joseph Mengele were the two most famous Nazis to escape to South America, though
Eichmann was later captured by Israeli secret agents, tried in Israel, and executed.
See generally MOSHE PEARLMAN, THE CAPTURE AND TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN (1963).
Mengele too was eventually captured and tried. See generally GERALD POSNER & JOHN
WARE, MENGELE: THE COMPLETE STORY (1986).
39.
TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 59.
40.
Bass, supra note 19, at 2103-04.
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Stalinist methods. 41 Though both the British and the Russians
feared that some Nazis might not receive their just desserts because
of the U.S. obsession with due process of law, the Nazis incriminated
themselves through the fastidious German habit of keeping careful
records. 42 One point, however, that the United States could not wvin
through the London negotiations was that the Nuremberg Tribunal's
jurisdiction was limited to crimes of the losing Axis Powers; there
would be no broader jurisdiction to crimes committed by Allied
43
Powers.
The vast conquests of the German army, the years of Nazi
occupation, and the worldwide publicity of heinous crimes stimulated
intense international interest in the Nuremberg trials.
The
prosecution, most notably Justice Robert Jackson, seized the moment
to impose international criminal liability for aggressive war, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide." By focusing world
outrage, assuaging grief, and stimulating German soul-searching by
the publicity of dreadful crimes, 45 the Nuremberg trials facilitated a

41.
TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 211. After the death of V.I. Lenin in 1924 Joseph
Stalin eliminated his enemies using mass arrests, deportations, secret trials, and show
trials. See generally ROY ALEKSANDROVICH MEDVEDEV, LET HIs'TORY JUDGE: THE
ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF STALINISM (George Shriver ed. and trans.. Columbia
University Press, 1989); ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULG ARCHIPELAGO. 19181956: AN EXPERIENT IN LITERARY INVESTIGATION (Thomas P. Whitney & Harry
Willetts trans., Harper & Row, 1974-78). As the Red Army advanced across Europe in
1945 thousands of German prisoners and civilians were shot or deported to
concentration camps. LUCAS, supranote 35, at 80-94.
42.
TAYLOR, supranote 20, at 86. Taylor noted:
Few of the defendants committed atrocities with their own hands, and in fact
they were rarely ... at ... the scenes of their worst crimes. They made plans
and transmitted orders, and the most compelling witnesses against them were
the documents which they drafted, signed, initialed, or distributed. The bulk of
these documents were available in each case by the time the indictment was
filed ....
Id.
43.
See generally Nuremberg Charter, supra note 9; see also supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
44.
See generally Nuremberg Charter, supra note 9.
45.
To the Japanese people, in contrast, the most apparent war crimes were the
Allied bombings of civilians, specifically the nuclear attacks at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki." MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 181
(1997). While millions of Germans had witnessed Nazi brutality and thousands were
herded by their Allied conquerors through the death camps, the Japanese people were
generally remote from the scenes of their armies' war crimes. Id. Nanking, Manila,
and Singapore, for instance, are overseas and far away. Id. -Because of the centrality
of Hiroshima to Japanese memory of the period, it has become 'virtually impossible...
to recall that Japan had been waging a war of aggression prior to Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.' In contrast, the impact on the national memory of the Yamasluta and
Tokyo War Crimes Trials-widely broadcast to the population-has been virtually nil,
until very recently." Id. (quoting NORMA FIELD, IN THE REALM OF A DYING EMPEROR 45

(1991)).
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catharsis to the Second World War that is by no means complete, but
is certainly better than the festering scars of the Peace of Paris in
1919.46

The trials of the Nazis at Nuremberg relied less on the testimony
of surviving witnesses than on mountains of documents maintained
by a regime that saw itself as having an historic mission to exploit
and exterminate its perceived enemies. 47 Under this sense of destiny,
the Nazis took great pains to record the planning and execution of
48
thousands.
The circumstances unique to the collapse of Nazi Germany in
1945 resulted in tremendous success for the prosecutors of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and broad
international support for the verdicts. 49 Not once since then have
three relatively equal powers beaten a major world power through
force of arms, accepted the unconditional surrender of a leaderless
and demoralized enemy, established a joint occupation, and
prosecuted the enemy for war crimes by relying largely on that
51
enemy's own documents. 50 Not even in Tokyo.
The Tokyo Tribunal demonstrates how political realities
influence, if not dictate, the effectiveness of the enforcement of
international criminal law. 52 Though Japan's industrial capacity and

navy had been shattered in 1945, millions of armed Japanese
remained resolved to die for their Emperor in suicidal attacks against
the pressing Allied forces.
Therefore, "the principal issue in
brokering the Japanese surrender was the status of the Emperor, a
subject that was debated both internally in the United States and on
the world stage."53 While it was known that the Emperor had no
operational political power, some in the State Department argued
that his divine status inspired fanatical militarism and necessitated
his removal, if not his execution. 54 The Emperor alone had the power

46.
Bass, supra note 19, at 2112.
47.
ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 123-24, 638-40 (Ralph Manheim, trans.,
Harcourt-Brace 1943) (1923); SHIRER, supra note 34, at 937-39.
48.
SHIRER, supra note 34, at 963-74.
49.
Bass, supranote 19, at 2103.
50.
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 15 (1997).
51.
See JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD

WAR II 443-84 (1999).
52.
Robert E. Ward, PresurrenderPlanning: Treatment of the Emperor and
Constitutional Change, in

DEMOCRATIZING JAPAN:

THE ALLIED OCCUPATION 1, 3

(Robert E. Ward & Sakamoto Yoshikazu eds., 1987).
53.
Noah Berlin, Comment, Constitutional Conflict with the JapaneseImperial
Role: Accession, Yasukuni Shrine, and ObligatoryReformation, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
383, 390-91 (1998).
54.
WILLIAM P. WOODARD, THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN, 1945-1952 AND
JAPANESE RELIGIONS 9-13 (1972).
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to amend the Japanese Constitution, however, and so the State
Department recognized that his continued status might be useful in
the postwar reformation of the Japanese nation. 55
The Japanese, even after two atomic attacks, agreed to
surrender only "with the understanding that the said Declaration
does not compromise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives
of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler."5 6 Before accepting these terms,
the United States requested that upon surrender the "authority of the
Emperor and the Japanese government to rule the state shall be
subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers."57 After
months of suicidal Japanese fighting for every island and hill, the
Allies, led by the United States, acquiesced to their enemy's
insistence that Emperor Hirohito remain titular head-of-state. 58
Thus, despite the pledge made with considerable fanfare that the
Allies would accept nothing but unconditional surrender, the Allies
59
granted this one concession to the Japanese.
The Emperor himself cooperated with the Allied powers
willingly, and within a month, General MacArthur defended the
Emperor and his status against international cries to try him as a
war criminal.60 He stated that such a trial would have "tragic
consequences," including the implementation of a "military
government" and "at least one million reinforcements" to combat
probable resistance and guerrilla warfare. 61
The Supreme
Commander persuaded both President Truman and the Congress not
to press the issue. 62 By then the international sentiment of "Bring
the boys home!" and the daily costs and risks of occupation prevailed
over any legal theory that the Emperor should be tried. 63 If the
Emperor's status was insurance that the Japanese would not resume
their suicidal fighting, then millions of families were willing to make

55.
Ward, supra note 52, at 3-4 (citing -Status of the Japanese Emperor:
National Archives, Notter Files, Box 63, J-315, May 25, 1943).
56.

PAUL MANNING, HIROHITO: THE WAR YEARS 157 (1986).

57.

Id. at 158.

58.
HERBERT FEIS, JAPAN SUBDUED:
VAR IN THE PACIFIC 118-120 (1961).

THE ATOMIC BOMB AND THE END OF THE

59.
Id. at 125-26. President Truman never regretted his decision to spare the
Japanese monarchy because it ended the war and saved thousands of lives.
MCCULLOUGH, supra note 27, at 459-60. Nonetheless, it was of tremendous symbolic
importance to the Japanese and compromised the American commitment (adverse to
our British allies) to establish republican forms of government in the postwar world.
See id. Truman wrote that if the Japanese wished to keep their Emperor. "we'd tell 'em

how to keep him."
60.

(1989).
61.
62.
63.

THOMAS CRUMP, THE DEATH OF AN EMPEROR: JAPAN AT A CROSSROADS 154

Id. at 177.
MANNING, supra note 56, at 219-21.
FEIS, supranote 58, at 126.
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such a bargain. 64 Thus, the U.S. public policy of ending the fighting
and bringing the servicemen out of harm's way saved the Emperor
65
and the monarchy.
But the largely unilateral U.S. decision to spare the Emperor
was not without its critics. The Australians and Russians wished to
indict the Emperor, and the Australians even reminded the
Americans of Justice Jackson's words at Nuremberg that "any head of
state who launches aggressive war is personally guilty as a war
criminal. '66 But militarily and politically speaking, they were in
little position to argue, for the "Americans, as the principal occupying
'67
power, had vetoed all Allied opposition.
The structure of the Allied command in the Far East was
instrumental for the U.S. dominance of postwar policy in Japan. In
contrast to the situation in Europe, 68 the United States commanded
every Far Eastern theater of war, even when outnumbered, as in

64.
MCCULLOUGH, supra note 27, at 451-52.
65.
BRACKIIMAN, supra note 12, at 77-78. The Australians brought the issue up
again in January 1946, but the Supreme Commander responded: "His indictment will
unquestionably cause a tremendous convulsion among the Japanese people, the
repercussions of which cannot be overestimated." Id. MacArthur told the chief Allied
prosecutor, Joseph Keenan, that the Emperor could be neither a defendant nor a
witness at the trials. Id.; see also OSIEL, supra note 45, at 186-87 ('To exclude the
Emperor from criminal liability was also implicitly to exclude the Japanese people at
large from moral responsibility ....
More concretely, the Allied decision to protect
Hirohito 'impeded the awakening of the Japanese people's own historical
consciousness."').
66.
BRACKMAN, supra note 12, at 77.
67.
Id. at 78. Though the Chinese and many other Asian peoples suffered
ghastly casualties, there was little doubt in 1945 that the American resources of
technology, firepower, and logistics had brought Japan to its knees. See SPECTOR,
supra note 21, at 560. After the British defeat at Singapore in 1942 the contest for
supremacy in Asia was between the Americans and the Japanese. Id. at 132.
68.
The command structure in Europe was diffused by history, politics, and
geography. See EISENHOWER, supra note 22, at 66-68. Britain had stood alone
heroically against Germany from June 1940 to June 1941, and Britain had served as
the base for the Allied invasion of France. SHIRER, supra note 34, at 774-82, 1036-39.
By 1945 it was the weight of American and Russian arms that crushed Germany, but
British stature remained high. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 27, at 411-12. Churchill, by
his stubborn resistance and will, equaled Roosevelt and dwarfed Truman in prestige.
Id. at 412. On the Western Front, British and American officers shared in an
integrated Allied command of which Eisenhower was the Supreme Commander, but by
no means a potentate. EISENHOWER, supra note 22, at 66-68. On the Eastern Front,
the Russians maintained a command independent of any American or British
influence. SULZBERGER, supra note 29, at 71-72. At Yalta, the Big Three had
negotiated occupation zones, and at London, joined by France, they negotiated the
jurisdiction of the Nuremberg tribunal. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 9, art. 1.
Thus, the military situation in Europe, both on the ground and in the command
structure, prevented the Americans from dictating postwar policy, including the
workings of the Nuremberg tribunal. TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 59-60.
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China and India, by the soldiers of allied nations. 69 Without U.S.
arms, Japan would not have been defeated shortly after Germany, if
at all. The Japanese army was never broken in the same sense the
German army was broken. In August 1945 millions of Japanese
soldiers continued to occupy the most populated regions of China,
French Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies and to brace for an
invasion of the home islands. 70 Without discounting the valor and
sufferings of all the Allied Powers in the Far East, it can be asserted
that the subjugation and subsequent occupation of Japan was
accomplished largely through U.S. firepower and resources. 7 1 As
Allied forces prepared to invade Japan, the U.S. Pacific Fleet
outnumbered the rest of the world's warships combined, and the U.S.
Air Force ended the savage war with the world's only nuclear attacks.
When Japan surrendered, there were no occupation zones in the
home islands as there were in Germany. The Allied troops arrived
under the Supreme Command of General MacArthur, and most of
72
those troops were from the United States.
The Allied command structure favored U.S. dominance, and the
presence of MacArthur assured it. 73 Unlike General Dwight D.
Eisenhower, MacArthur was by nature an autocrat rather than a
diplomat, and by the terms of the Japanese surrender, he became
shogun74 to the Emperor and functioned as a Roman proconsul in his
relations to his own government. 75
Alhough the Supreme
Commander exercised little operational control over the Tokyo
Tribunal other than declaring the Emperor unimpeachable, his

69.

See generally BARBARA W. TUCHMAN. STILWELL AND TIlE AMERICA,

EXPERIENCE IN CHINA, 1911-45 (1970). The three principal theater commanders
during the war in the Pacific were American officers: Admiral Chester Nimitz, General
Douglas MacArthur, and General Joseph Stilwell. SPECTOR, supra note 21, at 144-46.
All three commanded soldiers and sailors of all Allied powers, and in Stilwells case,
most of the soldiers in the China-Burma-India Theater were not Americans. Id. at 142.
43. But see WHITE, supranote 33, at 149.
70.
The Chinese had suffered more deaths than any other Far Eastern ally,
thus giving Chiang Kai-shek a pyrrhic victory; Mao Zedong's communists would scon
win their civil war. WHITE, supra note 33, at 132-33. The Russians entered the war i
the Far East only one week before Japan's surrender. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 27, at
457. The Russians captured Manchuria and northern Korea rather quickly, and these
late actions resulted in communist control of both regions. THEODORE H. WHITE &
ANNALEE JACOBY, THUNDER OUT OF CHINA 132-35, 279-83 (1946).
71.
DONALD M. NELSON, ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY: THE STORY OF AMERICAN

WAR PRODUCTION ix (1946); SPECTOR, supranote 21. at xiv.
72.
WILLIAM MANCHESTER, AMERICAN CAESAR: DOUGLAS MACARTHUR. 18801964 497 (1978).
73.

Id.

74.
The Shogun was the power behind the throne in feudal Japan, a sort of
prime minister or vizier. DOWER, supranote 51, at 19, 203.
75.
MANCHESTER, supra note 72, at 466. A Roman proconsul was governor of a
province and military commander of legions outside of Rome proper. MATrHEW
BURSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 348 (1994).
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dominance over postwar Japan and his ultimate power to review
sentences 76 left the lasting impression that the Tribunal
77
administered the "victors' justice."
The rules of evidence and procedure support that impression.
The Tokyo Charter provided: '"The tribunal shall not be bound by
technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest
possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall
admit any evidence that it deems to have probative value."7 8 While
this provision was almost identical to one at Nuremberg, the Tokyo
Tribunal relied upon its liberality more than did the Nuremberg
Tribunal, partly because the Japanese destroyed thousands of

76.
The United States Supreme Court refused to review the war crimes trials.
See Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948) (per curiam):
We are satisfied that the tribunal sentencing these petitioners is not a tribunal
of the United States. The United States and other allied powers conquered and
now occupy and control Japan. General Douglas MacArthur has been selected
and is acting as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers .... Under the
foregoing circumstances the courts of the United States have no power or
authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgements and sentences
imposed.
77.
RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL
179-80 (1971); see also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1946) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting). General Tomoyuki Yamashita was held criminally liable by a U.S.
Military Commission in the Philippines (not the International Tribunal at Tokyo) for
failing to prevent dozens of war crimes committed by 260,000 Japanese troops
scattered across the hundreds of islands of the Philippine archipelago. BRACKMAN,
supra note 14, at 242-48. Many of the crimes were committed by Navy personnel only
nominally under his command and in the final stages of defeat, and no proof was
offered that Yamashita ordered or knew of any of the atrocities. MANCHESTER, supra
note 72, at 487. His swift trial offered little time to prepare an affirmative defense, or
even plan the cross-examination of witnesses, and the rules of evidence set by military
decree were so broad as to make guilt the foregone conclusion. Id. at 484-85. Justice
Murphy summarized the procedures with biting sarcasm:
We the victorious American forces, have done everything possible to destroy
and disorganize your lines of communication, your effective control of your
personnel, your ability to wage war. In those respects we have succeeded. We
have defeated and crushed your forces. And now we charge and condemn you
for having been inefficient in maintaining control of your troops during the
period when we were so effectively besieging and eliminating your forces and
blocking effective control. Many terrible atrocities were committed by your
disorganized troops. Because these atrocities were so widespread we will not
bother to charge or prove that you committed, ordered or condoned any of them.
We will assume that they must have resulted from your inefficiency and
negligence as a commander. In short, we charge you with the crime of
inefficiency in controlling your troops. We will judge the discharge of your
duties by the disorganization which we ourselves created in large part. Our
standards of judgment are whatever we wish to make them.
Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 34-35.
78.
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo
Charter), U.S. Dept. of State Publication 2765 at 5-16.
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documents to keep them out of the hands of the Allies.7 9 In fact, the
Tribunal did not reject evidence submitted by the prosecution.
The
only evidence rejected at Tokyo was evidence in support of the
defendants against charges of aggressive war, specifically regarding
the foreign policies and war aims of the Allied Powers.8 1 The
Tribunal allowed no such discussion.8 2 The rules of procedure were
just as questionable. One death sentence was imposed following a
six-to-five vote; the other six death sentences were by votes of seven
to four.8 3 By a vote of six to five, the Tribunal chose the gallows over
a firing squad as the method of execution.I
Such verdicts and
sentences would have been unconstitutional in many, if not most, of
the nations participating on the Tribunal.8 5
The results of the Tokyo Tribunal were harsh but inconsistent.
Hirota, a civilian who as Premier during the late 1930s had
advocated Japanese expansion but was not directly tied to any war
crimes, was one of those executed.8 6 According to the dissenting
Dutch justice, Hirota was not guilty of any crime.8 7 Koichi Kido,
keeper of the privy seal and the Emperor's closest advisor, was
sentenced to life imprisonment;8 8 he was not directly connected to any
war crimes, but rather, his crime was his failure to investigate on
behalf of the Emperor the reports of crimes committed.8 9
By these standards, the Emperor should have also been in the
dock, and His Majesty's absence as a defendant or witness became all
the more conspicuous as every document and officer claimed to act in
his name. 90 In his concurring opinion, Sir William Webb of Australia
observed that the Emperor's authority was apparent when the
Emperor, not the atomic bombs, stopped the war.9 1 The Emperor's

79.
BRACKMAN, supra note 12, at 39-41. The Japanese took advantage of the
two-week period between the cease-fire and the coming of Allied troops to the home
islands to destroy incriminating state and military papers. Id.
80.
MINEAB, supranote 77, at 120.
81.
Id. at 120-21.
82.
Id. at 121.
83.
Id. at 90-91.
84.
Id.
85.
Id. at 90-92.
86.
Id. at 71-72.
87.
BRACKMAN, supra note 12, at 389. Justice Roling later wrote that
aggressive war was a valid crime, but that such an offense should not by itself carry a
death sentence. See James A.R. Nafziger, 90 AM. J. INt'L L. 342, 342 (1996) (reviewing
B.V.A. ROLING AND ANTONIO CASSESE, THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND (1993)).
88.
BRACKMAN, supranote 12, at 408.
89.
Id. at 274.
90.
See id. at 390. The French justice, Henri Bernard, considered the whole
procedure flawed because the "principal author," the Emperor, was not among those
accused. Id.
91.
Id. at 387.
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immunity, while a political expediency, did not remove his moral
responsibility to try to prevent the war, even at the risk of his life. 92
For the foregoing reasons, the Tokyo Tribunal does not enjoy the
prestige and respect of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
The Tokyo
Tribunal, in retrospect, does not seem as just, and therefore is seldom
cited as a landmark in international criminal law, except in tandem
with Nuremberg.
The Tokyo Tribunal, unlike the Nuremberg
Tribunal, carries little independent moral force.
Several
circumstantial factors differentiate the two, and these factors are
both political and legal:
(1) the German surrender was truly
unconditional, while the Japanese surrender was conditioned on the
Emperor's continued sovereignty and criminal immunity; (2)
Germany was almost completely conquered by the Allied armies,
while Japan's armies retained the strength and will to fight; (3)
Germany was already divided by the occupying armies when the
Nazis capitulated, while Japan's occupation was accomplished under
a unified command dominated by the United States; (4) the Big Four
negotiated the Nuremberg Charter by treaty, giving it international
standing, while the Tokyo Charter was decreed by the Supreme
Commander of the occupation forces; (5) while a majority vote was
required in both tribunals, rulings in the Nuremberg Tribunal were
often handed down with the consent of three out of four judges,
whereas in the Tokyo Tribunal a sample majority of the eleven judges
could rule on procedure, verdicts, and sentences; (6) at Nuremberg,
the prosecution had convincing evidence against most of the
defendants without pushing liberal rules of evidence, and as a result,
three were acquitted, while at Tokyo, the prosecution obtained at
least one very questionable conviction and death sentence and did so
by arguably stretching the same rules of evidence. 93 Not one was
acquitted.

92.
Id. at 387-88.
93.
Defense Appeal to General MacArthur, Nov. 21, 1948, reprinted in MINEAR,
supra note 77, at 207. The defense stated:
The verdict looks too much like an act of vengeance to impress the world with
our love for justice and fair play. The conviction of all the defendants alike,
even those whom the prosecution admits should not have been charged and of
those whose conviction they are "ashamed" compares unfavorably with the
result of the Nuremberg trial.
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B. InternationalCriminalTribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda

After the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, no international
criminal court sat for more than forty years. 94

Though a near

consensus exists among international lawyers that such a court
would facilitate justice, law, and order in lands torn by war and

anarchy, the unsolved questions of how such a court would work and
what its jurisdiction would be remained.9 5 Despite a growing body of
international human rights law building on the precedents set at
Nuremberg and Tokyo9 6 and stark images of crimes against
humanity in places such as Cambodia and Iraq, the United Nations
(UN) did not establish another international criminal court until
atrocities in the Balkans continued unabated for several years. The
United States and several European powers postured and issued
threatening press statements, but the problem only became worse.
Eventually, after Croatia had declared its independence from
Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had become a bloody killing
zone, the United Nations Security Council created the ICTY in May
1993. 97 Less than a year later, Rwanda erupted in genocidal violence

after President Juvenal Habyarimana was assassinated, resulting in
the deaths of approximately 800,000 people and the dispersal of two
million refugees to neighboring countries. 98 The United Nations
Security Council created the ICTR at the end of 1994. 9 9

94.
Vincent M. Creta, Comment. The Search for Justice in the Former
Yugoslavia and Beyond: Analyzing the Rights of the Accused Under the Statute and the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former
Yugoslavia, 20 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 381, 382 (1998).
95.
Stuart H. Deming, War Crimes and InternationalCriminal Law. 28 AKRO.N
L. REV. 421, 421 (1995).
96.
See generally Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984. S. Treaty Dec.
100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
97.
Sean D. Murphy, Progressand Jurisprudenceof the InternationalCriminal
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 57 (1999).
98.
Paul J. Magnarella, Some Milestones and Achievements at the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The 1998 Kambanda and Ahayesu Cases, 11 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 517, 518 (1997).
99.
Id. at 520-21.
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The ICTY 00 and ICTR, 1° 1 like the Nuremberg and Tokyo
tribunals, are ad hoc courts of limited jurisdiction. They were
established in response to a widespread international conviction that
war crimes and acts of genocide should not go unpunished. 0 2 The
crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICTY include grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations of the laws or customs of
war, genocide, and crimes against humanity. 10 3 The jurisdiction of
10 4
the ICTR is the same except that it omits war crimes.
1. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
War crimes in the Balkans have a long history. On St. Vitus
Day, June 28, 1389, the Ottoman Turks defeated the Serbs at the
Battle of Kosovo. 10 5 Muslims ruled most of the Orthodox Serbs for
the next five centuries, forcing the Serbs to accept a second-class
status. 10 6 The Serbs frequently revolted. Other Slavs, especially in
the cities, converted to Islam and gained better status; later
generations of Serbs would resent the local Muslims for the decisions
of their ancestors.' 0 7 To the west, Catholic Croats and Slovenes
became part of the Hapsburg Empire and maintained relatively close
ties to Austria, Hungary, and Italy and tense relations with Muslim
Bosnians and Orthodox Serbs to the east and south.' 0 8 After the
Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913 Serbs obtained independence from the
Ottoman Empire. 0 9 During these wars Serb nationalists committed
gross acts of violence intended to change the "ethnic character" of
entire regions and unite all Serbs throughout the Balkans. 1 0 In an

100.

International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious

Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, UN Doc. S/25704, annex (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993),
availableat http://www.un.orgictylbasidstatut/statute.htm [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
101.
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994,
UN Doc. S/Res/955, annex (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1993), available at
http://www.un. org/ictylbasicstatut/statute.htm.
102.
See McDonald, supra note 3, at 32-33. But see Lucas W. Andrews,
Comment, Sailing Around the Flat Earth: The InternationalTribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia as a Failureof JurisprudentialTheory, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 471, 472-75
(1997) (arguing that the ICTY was the cynical creation of a Security Council that was
unwilling to prevent the violence but willing to set up a court for the sake of the
appearance of doing something).
103.
ICTY Statute, supra note 100, arts. 2-5.
104.
ICTR Statute, supranote 100, arts. 2-4.
105.
SCHARF, supra note 50, at 21-22. As Faulkner said, "The past is never
dead. It's not even the past." WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (1951).
106.
SCHARF, supra note 50, at 22.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.

109.

Id.

110.

Id.
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attempt to force the hated Austrians out of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a
Bosnian Serb nationalist and anarchist named Gavrilo Princip fired
the fateful bullets that killed the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to
the Hapsburg throne.'11 The date of the assassination was June 28,
1914, 525 years after the Battle of Kosovo."12 In refusing the
Austrian demands that the conspirators be turned over to justice,
Serbia relied on its traditional Orthodox ally, the Russian Czar.11 3 A
chain reaction of international alliances set off the First World War.
The Serbs fought on the winning side, and the Peace of Paris in
1919 gave birth to Yugoslavia, "the land of the south Slavs."1 1 4 King
Alexander of Serbia united an uneasy dominion of Serbs, Croats,
Slovenes, Macedonians, and other ethnicities, but this kingdom could
not survive the onslaught of the Second World War." 5 Between the
wars, Italian Fascists supported the Ustasha movement for Croatian
independence; an Ustasha assassin murdered King Alexander in
1934.116 After the Germans and Italians invaded and partitioned
Yugoslavia in 1941, the Ustashc gained supremacy in Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina and applied Nazi methods to exterminating the
Serbs. 117 It was the Croats that coined the term "ethnic cleansing;" in
acts of calculated terror, they killed more than a half-million Serbs
8
and drove off a million others."
Ironically, a Croatian communist by the name of Josip Broz Tito
reunited Yugoslavia by driving out the Fascists and Nazis and
murdering more than 100,000 Croats when the Ustasha surrendered
at the end of a civil war in 1946.119 Though the federal union of the
six republics within Yugoslavia remained weak, Tito maintained
control through his ruthless secret police and redrew state boundaries
to disperse the Serbs among several regional governments.1 20 The
Soviets helped Tito unite the factions within the Yugoslav union by
their threats to invade. 121 To face the threats, Tito maintained a
122
large national army trained in mountain warfare.
Tito died in 1980 and internecine war broke out in 1991.123
While the origins of ethnic strife in the region are ancient, a

111.
112.

See SCHARF, supranote 50, at 22.
Id.

113
114.

Id.
Id. at 22.

115.
Id. at 23-24.
116.
Id. at 23.
117.
MISHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA:
(rev. ed. 1994).
118.
SCHARF, supranote 50, at 23.
119.
Id. at 24.

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

THE THIRD BALKAN WAR 81
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government project of the 1980s undertaken "from the top down
incited rabid Serb nationalism.' 1 24 Slobovan Milosevic exploited
Serbian nationalism to became head of the Serbian Communist Party
in 1986, and garnered popular support by using federal troops to
suppress Albanians in Kosovo, where Serbs were vastly
outnumbered. 12 5 Using television as a powerful propaganda tool,
Milosevic reminded the Serbs of centuries of oppression from the
Ottoman Turks to the Croatian Ustasha.126 In 1991 Milosevic
prevented Stipe Mesic, a Croat, from assuming the federal presidency
as provided under the constitutional rotation. 127
Croatia and
Slovenia declared independence, and Milosevic sent units of the
128
Yugoslav National Army into those regions.
While Slovenia withstood the attacks of Serb forces and forced
their withdrawal, the Serbs seized control of one third of Croatia's
territory in the fall of 1991.129 In the Croatian town of Vukovar, the
Serbs murdered two-hundred hospital patients and buried them in a
mass grave. 130 After thousands of casualties, the United Nations
brokered a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army. 13 1
Four years later, rearmed with German aid, Croatia recaptured its
132
lost territories.

124.
WARREN ZIMMERMANN, ORIGINS OF A CATASTROPHE: YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS
DESTROYERS-AMERICA'S LAST AMBASSADOR TELLS WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY 138
(1996).
125.
See SCHARF, supra note 50, at 25.
126.
ZIMMERMANN, supra note 124, at 120.
127.
SCHARF, supra note 50, at 26. According to the Yugoslav constitution, the
presidency was to rotate annually among the six republics. Id.
128.
See id.
129.
Id.
130.
Id.; see also The City of Vukovar, at http://www.vukovar.hr/en/index.htm
(last visited Jan. 7, 2001) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational

Law).
131.
SCHARF, supra note 50, at 27.
132.
Id. The ICTY has requested that the Croatian government turn over to the
authorities in the Hague transcripts of talks between the late President Tudjman and
his closest advisors regarding the war of reconquest. S. Despot & A. Phsic, War.Tne
Government Preparing Joint Statement for ICTY, CROATIAN INFORMATION CENTRE,
January 5, 2001, at http://www.hic.hr/englishlnews/politics.htm#icty (copy on file with
the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law). The ICTY is investigating charges of
"ethnic cleansing of Serbs by Croats when the Croatian army forced the Yugoslav army
out of Croatia." Id.; see also Croatian Government Unhappy With ICTY, CROATIAN
INFORMATION CENTRE-ZAGREB, Jan. 22, 1999, at http://www.dalmatia.net/croatia/
politics/unhappywith icty.htm (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law). Many Croatians feel that the ICTY reaches only Croats, never
Serbs:
[A] major difference Croatia has with the ICTY is the very serious rumour
about the possibility of processing a number of Croatian Army generals and
high ranking officials responsible for the command and implementation of
Operation Storm. Minister Granic reiterated that Storm was in all of its
elements a legitimate and professional military and police operation that
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Rather than stay attached to the belligerently nationalistic Serbs
dominating Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina voted for secession on
March 1, 1992.133 The ethnic composition of Bosnia at the time was
forty-three percent Slavic Muslim, thirty-one percent Serb, and
seventeen percent Croat. 134 Though the Serbs boycotted the election,

approximately sixty-three percent of the total electorate voted for
independence. 135 The European Community and the United States
136
recognized Bosnian independence.
The Serbs attacked almost immediately using demobilized troops
from the Yugoslav National Army and Bosnian Serb militias and
seized control of seventy percent of Bosnia's territory. 13 7 Against the
weak opposition of UN economic sanctions and peace-keeping troops,
Serb forces rained artillery shells and sniper fire at the Bosnian
towns they did not control. 138 In the areas under Serb control,
"ethnic cleansing" of non-Serbs was the policy: murder, beatings,
rapes, concentration camps, 3 9 confiscation of property, and the
burning of villages. 140 By the end of 1994 the Serbs had killed,
incarcerated, or dispersed ninety percent of the 1.7 million non-Serbs
141
who had once lived in Bosnia.
The Security Council of the United Nations, to understate the
point, took no effective action to prevent the "ethnic cleansing." Had

created the elements needed for the war and crisis to also end in Bosnia &
Herzegovina ....

It is interesting that when it was founded. The Hague

tribunal was defined as being an independent judicial body that was above all
politics, i.e., that it would not be subservient to any political policies. Having
that in mind, it is interesting to note that not a single person has been accused
of committing crimes against B & H Croats.
Id.
On a similar note, a prominent Croatian writer told an American journalist: 'They
[Croatian soldiers] were unique volunteers in Croatian history ....They believed they
were fighting a noble war for Croatia, but the only thing they've got was threats from
The Hague, and from people who could not differentiate between justice and war
crimes." Georgie Anne Geyer, International Organizatons Focus 'Attenton' On
Croatia, Oct. 26, 1999, httpvwww.uexpress.comups/opinionicolumngg/text/19991lof
gg9910262719.html.
133.
SCHARF, supra note 50, at 27-28.
134. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, 1 AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 19 (1995).
135.
SCHARF, supra note 50, at 27.
136.
Id.
137.
Id. at 28. Though the Serb nationalist forces in Bosnia were not officially
under the command of the Milosevic government in Belgrade. Milosevic had
deliberately transferred all Serb army officers native to Bosnia to their home province
in anticipation of such use. See LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YULGOSLAVIA DEATH
OFA NATION 218 (1995).
138. See SCHARF, supra note 50, at 28-29.
139.
See SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 137, at 250.
140.
SCHARF, supra note 50, at 28-29.
141.
Id.
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UN soldiers entered Bosnia at the time of the election for Bosnian
independence, the Serbs would have been unable to exploit the
military weaknesses of Bosnians without triggering an armed
response from the Security Council. 142 The UN economic sanctions
had little effect, and the arms embargo prevented the Bosnian
Muslims from defending themselves, while the Serbs continued to
receive arms from Belgrade. 143 The "no-fly" zone was violated with
impunity, and the UN "safe areas" became synonymous with
"massacre." 144 The United Nations never backed threats with force
until the NATO air strikes of 1995; between the outbreak of the
Bosnian war in 1992 and the bombing campaign of 1995 more than
145
100,000 died.
Having failed to prevent the carnage, the Security Council
created the first international criminal tribunal since the Second
World War. 14 6 The ICTY is an ad hoc court established under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter by which the Security Council is
authorized to enforce the peace. 14 7 The ICTY statute imposes a duty
on all members of the United Nations to cooperate with its
investigations and arrests. 148 The ICTY spent most of its first three
years dealing with administrative matters: offices and staff for the
headquarters at the Hague, field offices in the Balkans, international
cooperation in arrest and detention, funding, electing judges, and
149
adopting rules of procedure and evidence.
The tribunal's first trial, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,i5 0 resulted
in a conviction, but it illustrates some problems inherent in the
ICTY. 151 The most obvious problem for the ICTY is that those most

142.

Id. at 30.

143.
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 31 (1996).

144.

SCHARF, supra note 50, at 36.
ZIMMERMANN, supra note 124, at xi-xii.
146
See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 143, at 199-201.
147.
Jelena Pejic, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments
in International Law: Panel II: Adjudicating Violence: Problems Confronting
InternationalLaw and Policy on War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: The
Tribunal and the ICC: Do PrecedentsMatter?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 841, 842-43 (1997).
148.
Id. at 843-44.
149.
Sean D. Murphy, Developments in InternationalCriminal Law: Progress
and Jurisprudenceof the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
93 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 57 (1999).
150.
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, available at http:lun.org./icty/
judgement.htm. See SCHARF, supra note 50, at 97. Tadic did not stay in Bosnia, but
went to Munich, home to thousands of Serb, Croatian, and Bosnian immigrants, where
he was soon identified as a war criminal and arrested under German human rights law
on February 12, 1994. Id. The ICTY prosecutor, Richard Goldstone, obtained custody
of Tadic from the German government, and his trial resulted in the first international
criminal conviction since the Second World War. Id.
151.
See Jonathan A. Bush, Nuremberg: The Modern Law of War and Its
Limitations, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 2022, 2083-84 (1992) (citing the review essay of
145.
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responsible for the policy of ethnic cleansing are safe from
prosecution in Belgrade or in Bosnian Serb territory.'5 2 As important
as the Tadic trial is as a precedent, 15 3 Tadic himself was by no means
a major player in Balkan politics, 154 even if he was a despicable
character. 5 5 Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Miadic, for instance, are
two of the most notorious suspects for Bosnian war crimes, but
neither Bosnian Serb authorities nor the Federal Republic of
56
Yugoslavia will cooperate in arresting them.

TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR
(1992)).
In short, Nuremberg aimed at fairness, and by and large it succeeded, but
few war crimes trials since then have been as conscientiously constructed.
Doubtless Taylor would be greatly pleased, as would this reader, if the
principles of Nuremberg could be applied to halt, deter, and punish the sort of
gross violations occurring every day in Bosnia, both by 'trigger-pullers' and by
those higher-ups who have unleashed and supplied the criminals. But if
history is any guide, the chances are that future trials may well be unfair. Of
course the human rights community and the United Nations may try to
construct scrupulously fair trial structures. Praise is due them if they succeed,
but, if they do, they may find rather more acquittals than the public and
victims' groups are anticipating. 'There is some reason to think that the
convictions [at the Subsequent Proceedings] ... were the result of a fluke--that
is, 'the German proclivity for systematic records and the unexpectedly swift
final victory, which placed files of documents in Allied hands.' In other
settings, forensic evidence will be difficult to find, witnesses and victims may be
dead, and the burden of criminal proof will require the necessary but
frustrating acquittal of many offenders. More likely than convictions of the
guilty after fair trial is a repeat of the ominous pattern of summary trials,
conducted in a climate of extreme political passion, in areas only recently
liberated from the defendants' grasp. And, if the past is again any guide, after
the initial enthusiasm for justice has worn off, we are likely to see widespread,
premature pardons of convicted offenders.
Id.
152.
See Pejic, supra note 147, at 850.
153.
See SCHARF, supra note 50, at 223.
154.
See id. at 93-97. Dusko Tadic was a Serb pub owner from Korarac. a
predominantly Muslim town. Id. at 93-94. As ethnic tensions grew, he joined the Serb
Democratic Party and banned Muslims from his pub. Id. at 94. When the Serbs
besieged the town in May 1992 Tadic is said to have assisted them in selecting targets,
and when the town surrendered on May 26 Tadic allegedly singled out the leaders of
the town to the bloodthirsty Serbs, who executed them. Id. at 95. Of 15,000 Muslim
residents, 2,000 were killed by artillery fire, and 5,000 by summary execution. Id.
Kozarac is now a ghost town, and its name is stricken from Serbian maps. Id. The
Serb homes alone remain standing, including Tadic's. Id.
Id. at 213-14 and 222-24. Tadic stood trial for the murders of thirteen
155.
people and the torture of nineteen others, but was acquitted on all the murder counts
from lack of evidence. See id. The prosecution lacked evidence to pursue the charge of
genocide. Id. He was sentenced to prison. Id.
156.
See Pejic, supra note 147, at 850; Bosnian Entoy Callsfor Karadzic Arrest.
November 20, 2000, at httplvww.cnn.com/2000WORLDleurope/I lI20bosnia.envoyl
(copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law).
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Milosevic has also been indicted, but as head of the government
of Yugoslavia, he was not likely to be captured without a coup
d'etat.157 Indeed, it is arguable that the indictment made him less
likely to step down from power. As of this writing, despite the recent
election of the opposition leader Vojislav Kostunica as President of
Yugoslavia and the defeat of pro-Milosevic factions in Serbian state
elections, it remains uncertain whether the new government will
allow the international prosecution of Milosevic and his supporters.
Most recently, the new Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Goran Svilanovic,
insisted that any trial of Milosevic or his advisors, whether for
international human rights violations or domestic crimes, must take
place on Yugoslav soil. 158
Since the Tadic trial, the ICTY has obtained guilty pleas or
convictions for several other defendants, including the Croat general
Tihomir Blaskic, and captured and indicted the Bosnian Serb
16 0
generals Stanislav Galic, 159 Momir Talic, and Radislav Krstic.
Perhaps the ICTY will eventually try Milosevic and his leading
advisors as well. Nonetheless, the ICTY's task is not nearly so clear
and obtainable as the Nuremberg Tribunal's, despite the numerous
161
comparisons.

157.
But see "Realistic"Prospectof Trying Milosevic for War Crimes, AFX (AP), July
12, 1999, at http:/lw.vww.lexis.comlresearch/retrievelframes?m=id792a7lcdfd9b4704d
81cb338c4cc08+_fmtstr=-FULL+docum=l+ startdoc+l+_startchk=l+wchp=dGLSIVISIb2
+_md5=a3fed492866e69254783f68a6e4a214. "Asked about chances of actually putting
Milosevic on trial, [prosecutor Louis] Arbour said: 'I think it is very realistic. The question
is when and how-that I cannot tell you, but I believe that we have set in motion a process
that is completely irreversible." Id.
158.
Elisaveta Konstantinova, Yugoslavia to Form Own War Crimes BodyMinster, Jan. 27, 2001, http:lldailynews.yahoo.comlh/nm/20010125/wllyugoslavia_
warcrimesbulgaria dc 1.html.
159.
Bosnians Plead Not Guilty on Killing, Rape Charges, AGENCE-FRANCE
PRESSE, December 29, 1999, http.//www.lexis.comlresearchlretrieve/frames?mfet2d6e
6e099682e668088cd3722cc10+fmtstr=FULL+docnuin+3+startdoc = l+_startchk=l+wc
hp=dGLSIV-Islb2+_mds=87259dfdeO333991a2d6364be7clc297.
160.
Genocide Trial of Bosnian Serb General Opens, Europe's Worst Atrocity
Since World War I, Prosecutor Says, March 13, 2000, at http://vww.cnn.coml2000/
WORLDleuropeIO313lyugo.warcrimesl. (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law).
161.
See Charles Madigan & Colin McMahon, A Slow, Painful Quest for Justice,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 7, 1999, at 1. Michail Wladimiroff, defense counsel for several
tribunal cases, who supports the mission of the tribunal, said:
Nothing will happen in Kosovo. There is an effort to bring in foreign lawyers,
prosecutors and judges to run cases on a local basis ... but I really have my
doubts about whether it will be successful ....
They won't be able to do it,
because there is no clear victory ....
In normal times, if there is a killing, you
can go deep down to the bottom and go after the little ones, but after a war you
simply cannot do that ....
In war we have licensed killers ....
It changes
everything.
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2. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
Rwanda presents perhaps the clearest case of genocide since the
Holocaust. 62 On April 6, 1994, the population of Rwanda was
approximately eight million, of which about eighty-five percent were
Hutus and fourteen percent were Tutsis. 163 From April to July 1994
somewhere between 500,000 and 800,000 were killed, most of them
164
Tutsis.

The origins of the conflict, like those in the former Yugoslavia, go
back several centuries. In precolonial times, the aristocratic Tutsi
minority ruled, and later, German colonialists ruled the region
through Tutsi royalty. 165 The Belgians took over after the First
World War and established an "apartheid" system based on Tutsi
superiority and patrilineal descent, despite the widespread practice of
intermarriage among Hutus and Tutsis. 166 As a result, tribal
membership became more "rigid."167 After independence in 1962 the
Hutu majority dominated Rwandan politics and forced thousands of
Tutsis into exile, often in Uganda. 168 General Habyarimana came to
power in 1973 and prohibited Tutsis from holding positions of
leadership; all citizens were forced to carry ethnic identity cards. 169
After an attack on Rwanda by Tutsi exiles called the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF), Hutu nationalists intensified their attacks
against Tutsis, killing as many as 2,000 from 1990 to 1993.170
Despite French military assistance to the Hutus, 17 1 Habyarimana
was eventually forced to agree to share power with the Tutsis. He
and his cabinet, however, resisted this prospect by exploiting ethnic
hatred and planning mass murder. 17 2 The Rwandan government
trained "Hutu militia" in methods of extermination, compiled lists of
173
Tutsis, and distributed firearms and machetes.
The death of President Habyarimana sparked a rampage of
killing seldom matched this century. 17 4 Immediately following the

162.
24 YALE J.
163.
164.
165.

Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate. Lessons from Rivanda,
INr'L L. 365, 365 (1999).
Magnarella, supra note 98, at 519.
Alvarez, supranote 162, at n.10.
See 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P.

SCHARF, THE I, rERN.ATIONAL

CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 48-49 (1995).
166.
Id. at 48-49 n.223. Rwanda is approximately sixty.five percent Catholic,
nine percent Protestant, one percent Muslim, and twenty-five percent indigenous
religions, but differences in religion apparently did not influence the genocide. Id.
167
Id. at 48-49.
168.
See Magnarella, supra note 98, at 519-20.
169.
Id.
Id.
170.
171.
See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 165, at 52-53.
172.
See id. at 53-55.
173.
Id. at 52-53.
174.
See id. at 53-59.
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plane crash, Hutu extremists in the army and militia implemented
the plans to exterminate the Tutsis, and the moderate Hutus who
would oppose such action. 175 They began by assassinating all
moderate members of the cabinet, including the prime minister. 176
They erected barricades and conducted a "systematic slaughter" by
checking ethnic identification cards. 177 Whether on the street, in the
hospital, at school, or in a church, Tutsis were murdered
178
mercilessly.
The planners of the genocide allegedly included the widow of
General Habyarimana as well as the leader of Habyarimana's
party, 179 the president of the interim government, 180 the prime
minister of the interim government, 181 and the ministers of justice
and defense. 182 The operators of radio stations and newspapers, often
friends or members of the Habyarimana family, were also implicated
as planners and leaders of the genocide. 18 3 The implementers
included thousands of Hutus at all levels of society, in and out of the
military and government. 184 Considering the number of army officers
and civic officials that actively participated, it is impossible to
conclude that the genocide was not planned at the highest levels of
the governing party. 185
Not unlike the situation in the Balkans, the United Nations
Security Council's actions did nothing to stop the carnage. 186 Despite
the Secretary-General's recommendations to increase the peacekeeping force, the Security Council voted to reduce the force from
1,515 to 270.18 7 A few months later, however, the Security Council
authorized the French to send troops to establish a "humanitarian
protected zone" in southeast Rwanda, but the French troops did not
prevent the Hutus from continuing the slaughter; the Hutus even

175.

See id. at 53-54.

176.

MORRIS & SHARF, supra note 165, at 54.

177.
Id. at 54.
178.
See id. at 54-55.
179.
Agathe Habyarimana is General Habyarimana's widow, and Matthieu
Ngirumpatse was the leader of Habyarimana's political party. See id. at 55.
180.
Theodore Sindikubwabo was the president of the interim government. See

id.
181.
182.

Jean Kambanda. See id.
Agnes Ntamabyariro and Augustin Bizimana, respectively. See id. at 55-

56.
183.
See id. at 56.
184.
See MORRIS & SHARF, supra note 165, at 55-58.
185.
See id. at 57-58.
186.
Karen MacGregor, Survivors Sue UN for 'Complicity' in Rwanda Genocide,
Independent News, January 11, 2000, at http.//www.independent.co.uklnews/
worldAl.../Rwandall0100.shtm (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law).
187.
MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 165, at 59-60.
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broadcast genocidal hatred over the radio from within the zone.188
Once again, the nations which possibly possessed the military
capability to intervene refused to act. 189
After about one hundred days of unspeakable bloodshed, the
Hutu extremist government was overthrown by the army of Tutsi
exiles, the RPF.190 They formed a new government on July 18, 1994,
and called it the Rwanda Unity Government. Hutus and Tutsis
participated. 19 1 Though the Tutsi exiles had been first to call for an
international criminal tribunal when the genocide began,1 9 2 once in
power the new coalition government opposed such a tribunal until it
realized that the worst culprits of the genocide had fled Rwanda and
would be free from Rwandan prosecution. 19 3 Moreover, the Rwandan
justice system was nearly destroyed, thus undermining domestic
194
prosecutions of the thousands of murderers still in Rwanda.
In a process not unlike the one that created the ICTY, the
Security Council created the ad hoc ICTR. 195
Several points of
tension between the ICTR and the Rwandan government nonetheless
remain. First, the ICTR is controlled by foreigners but pursues
justice for crimes committed in Rwanda and adjacent countries. 196
The Rwandans naturally feel a loss of control of their own destiny
and irritation that convicted killers will not get the death penalty, but

188.
Id. at 60-61.
189.
It is quite debatable if any power could have acted quickly enough to save
most of the lives lost. See Mark Weisburd, InternationalLaw and the Problem of Evil,
34 VAND. J. TRANsNAT'L. L. 225, 239-40 nn.74-84 (2001). According to Weisburd's
analysis, it would have been unlikely that Western intelligence could have confirmed
the fact of the ongoing genocide before April 20, though the genocide began on April 7.
Id. It is doubtful that a significant military force could have been operational in
Rwanda before mid-May because military jet transports require facilities beyond the
capacities of Rwanda's airports. Id. Thus, Weisburd argues that the success of a
military intervention was far from certain and would have been too tardy to prevent
most of the bloodshed. Id.
190.
The fact that the RPF fought its way to power is remarkable in that it
shows the military prowess of the Hutu extremists to have been too little to stop a
determined foreign intervention by American or British soldiers. Id. The history of the
century is full of examples of seemingly short and simple interventions that became
military and political defeats for the superior powers--Somalia, Lebanon, Afghanistan,
Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, and the Suez Canal. Id. Air.drops are especially risky and
often result in significant casualties from accidents as well as from enemy fire. Id.
Military leaders are understandably reluctant to risk their best fighting units on
humanitarian missions in which the only logistical support must be by air. Id.
191.
See Magnarella, supra note 98, at 520.
192.
See MORRIS & SCHARF, supranote 165, at 60-62.
193.
See id. at 66-67.
194. See id.
195.
See generally Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda.- The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AI. J. INT'rL L. 501 (1996);
Paul J. Magnarella, Expanding the Frontiersof HumanitarianLaw: The International
Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, 9 FLA. J. INTIL L. 421 (1994).
196.
See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 165, at 68.
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197
rather, will serve their time in "some posh facility" in Europe.
Secondly, the ICTR, like the ICTY, took years to begin its first trial,
and despite setting some impressive precedents, only a handful of the
198
defendants have been prosecuted.
Two cases in particular deserve mention as milestones in
international law. In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 199 an international
criminal tribunal tried and convicted an individual for genocide and
crimes of sexual violence. The tribunal defined rape, listed as a crime
against humanity under the ICTR statute, and applied its definition
in a human rights context. 20 0 In Prosecutor v. Kambanda,20 1 the expremier of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda, became "the first person in
history to accept responsibility for genocide before an international
court. ' 20 2 Thus, the ICTR, too slow for the demands of justice and too
small for the task of punishing a massive government-mandated
genocide, has nonetheless set important precedents in international
criminal law.

III.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

The ICTY and ICTR, despite their flaws, provided the impetus
for the creation of a permanent international criminal court. 20 3 The
inefficiency of an ad hoc tribunal to bring to justice even the worst
offenders was demonstrated by the tremendous cost of the Tadic
trial 20 4 and the length of time necessary to negotiate and implement
the ICTR Statute. 20 5 A permanent international criminal court was
contemplated at the end of the First World War and again after
Nuremberg, but was shelved due to Cold War politics until the fall of
the Berlin Wall in 1989.206 The end of bipolar geopolitics and the

197.
Id. Capital punishment is practiced under Rwandan law but prohibited
under Article 23 of the ICTR Statute. Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 23.
198.
Id.
199.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998), available at http//:www.
ictr.org/english/ judgments/akayesu.html.
200.
Id.; see also Diane Marie Amann, International Decision: Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case ICTR-96-4-T. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Sept. 2,
1998. 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 195, 195-96 (1999). The classification of rape as a human
rights violation has received considerable attention. See generally Kelly D. Askin,
Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals:
Current Status, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 97 (1999).
201.
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S (Sept. 4, 1998), available
at http/:www.ictr.org/english/judgmentslkambanda.html.
202.
Magnarella, supra note 98, at 518.
203.
See Sheffer, supra note 14, at 13.
204.
See SCHARF, supra note 50, at 80-84. The cost of the Tadic trial alone was
approximately $20 million. Id. at 224.
205.
See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 165, at 67-72.
206.
See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Developments in InternationalCriminal Law:
The Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 22, 22 (1999).
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experience of international cooperation during the Persian Gulf War
in 1991 opened fresh opportunities in human rights law. Neither the
crisis in Yugoslavia nor the genocide in Rwanda could be blamed on
the Soviet Union, and the trials before the ICTY and ICTR brought
hope that a little deterrence by the powerful and free may spare the
20 7
blood of the weak.
During the summer of 1998 delegates from most of the world's
nations gathered in Rome to negotiate a statute to create a
permanent international criminal court.20 8 The conference concluded
with the adoption of what is now called the Rome Statute of the
ICC.209 By an unrecorded vote, 120 nations were in favor, 7 opposed,
and 21 abstained. 210 The United States stated publicly that it
opposed the statute as written,2 11 while France, Britain, and Russia
2 12
indicated their support.
While there is a general consensus among international lawyers
that a permanent international criminal court would be useful, "the
real issue is how it will work' '2 13 an issue that consumed most of the
attention of the Rome Conference. 2 14 The most debated provisions of
the statute included: (1) the crimes under jurisdiction of the court, (2)
the definitions of those crimes, (3) and the independence of the office
of prosecutor. 215 Less debated provisions, but still vital to the
prestige and success of the court include the general obligation of

207.
See SCHARF, supra note 50, at 220.
208.
Arsanjani, supra note 206, at 22.
209.
See id.
210.
Id
211.
On December 31, 2000, the United States signed the Rome Statute. President
Clinton maintained that the United States remains opposed to the treaty as written, but
that the United States signed the treaty in order to be allowed to participate in further
negotiations over its procedures and rules of evidence. If the United States had not signed
by the end of the year 2000, it would have been barred from these negotiations. As of this
writing, only twenty-seven of the sixty nations required to bring the ICC into being have
ratified the Rome Statute. Signing costs little; ratification is what matters. It is doubtful
that the U.S. Senate will ratify the Rome Statute in the foreseeable future because of
widespread opposition. See Lawrence L Knutson. Clinton Supports War Crimes Court,
WASH. PoSr, December 31, 2000, httpvJIwv.waslingtonpoLcom/,psrvaponline
20001231/ aponline212301_000.htm.
212.
Arsanjani, supra note 206, at 22; Charney. supra note 4. at 454. Of the
seven unrecorded votes against the statute, only the United States made its vote
public, and its reservations are textual rather than conceptual. Charney, supra note 4,
at 454. The other likely opposed countries were China, Israel, Libya, and Iraq. Id.
213.
Deming, supranote 95, at 421.
214.
See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes. Developments in Internatonal
Criminal Law: The Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court: The
NegotiatingProcess, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2. 3-4 (1999).
215.
Arsanjani, supra note 206, at 25-27.
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indictments of the
nations to cooperate with the investigations 2and
16
court and the rules of procedure and evidence.
The jurisdiction of the ICC is "over persons for the most serious
crimes of international concern .. .and complementary to national
criminal jurisdictions." 217 In other words, the ICC's jurisdiction is
concurrent unless a nation cannot or will not cooperate. 2 18 These
serious crimes include the crime of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.2 19 Several
delegations strongly advocated the inclusion of drug-trafficking and
terrorism in the list of crimes, but to no avail. 220 The crime of
aggression was included, despite the lack of agreement on its
221
definition.
222
The Rome Statute can and does contain substantive law,
including definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes 223 because the ICC is the creation of international treaty, not
an ad hoc arm of the Security Council. In this way, international
criminal law, which first developed ex post facto (at least to some
extent) at Nuremberg, 224 is becoming positive law. 225 Genocide is the
shortest of the three articles, and because of its mens rea
requirement, it remains most difficult to prove. 226 The definition of
crimes against humanity reflects the recent interpretation by the
ICTY eliminating the nexus between armed conflict and crimes
against humanity. 227 Crimes against humanity include murder,

216.
See Charney, supra note 4, at 463. "Without custody of the accused or the
necessary evidence, convictions will be impossible. To become an effective institution,
the ICC will need strong and widespread international support so that it can build a
record of success and credibility and thus establish its legitimacy." Id.
217.
Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 1.
Arsanjani, supra note 206, at 24-25; Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 17.
218.
219.
Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 5.
See Kirsch & Holmes, supranote 214, at 6.
220.
221.
See id.
222.
But see id. at 7, n.19 (claiming that the purpose of the statute was "not to
create new substantive law, but only to include crimes already prohibited under
international law.").
223.
Rome Statute, supra note 8, arts. 6-8. The Security Council cannot create
substantive law; it can merely establish a tribunal such as the ICTY and ICTR to
enforce existing laws. See generally UN Charter, arts. 23-51.
224.
See TAYLOR, supranote 10, at 635-36.
225.
See Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals
for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
302, 308-09 (1999).
226.
See Press Release, Goran Jelisic Sentenced to 40 Years Imprisonment for
1999,
War
Crimes,
December
14,
Against
Humanity
and
Crimes
http://www.un.org/ictylpressreal/p454-e.htm. Jelisic pled guilty to 34 crimes, but the
final count, genocide, went to trial, and Jelisic was acquitted because the prosecution
failed to prove an intent to destroy an ethnic group, in whole or in part. Id.
227.
See Hwang, supra note 2, at 501; William J. Fenrick, Should Crimes
Against Humanity Replace War Crimes?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNA'L L. 767 (1999).
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extermination, enslavement, deportation, unlawful imprisonment,
torture, rape and sexual violence, persecution, enforced
228
disappearance of persons, apartheid, and other inhumane acts.
Regarding war crimes, the Rome Statute largely reiterates the
229
definitions of the Geneva Conventions.
Given the amount of text dedicated to genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes, the lack of an article defining "aggression"
is conspicuous. Characterizing aggressive war as a crime is what
Justice Jackson considered to be the most important precedent of the
Nuremberg trials. 23 0 A definition of aggressive war, however, was
not agreed upon at Rome; indeed, even the best definition of
aggressive war might be subjectively exploited by propagandists from
any power seeking ICC prosecutions against its enemies. 23 1 As a
result of this omission, the United States and other nations fear that
the ICC might impair controversial foreign policy judgments with the
threat of criminal indictments, thereby compromising national
23 2
interests.
With the crime of aggressive war left undefined, the
independence of the ICC prosecutor becomes an even more crucial
issue. The nations at the Rome Conference fell roughly into three
groups, with obvious exceptions and overlaps. The largest group
favored a strong court independent of the Security Council.2 33 The
second group consisted of the permanent members of the Security
Council, and this group sought a strong role for the Security Council
over the jurisdiction of the ICC as well as the exclusion of nuclear
weapons from the list of weapons prohibited by the statute.2 34 The
third group was hostile to the Security Council, insistent that nuclear
weapons be prohibited in the statute, and also generally in favor in a
235
court of restricted powers.

228. See Rome Statute, supra note 8,art. 7.
229. See id. art. 8, para. 2(a).
230. See Statement by Robert Jackson, Nov. 21, 1945, 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 155 (1949). Jackson
stated near the conclusion of his remarks: "The refuge of the defendants can be only
their hope that international law will lag so far behind the moral sense of mankind
that conduct which is crime in the moral sense must be regarded as innocent in law."
Id.
231. See Cara Levy Rodriguez, Note, Sl ying the Monster: 1l7y the United
States Should Not Support the Rome Treaty, 14 ANI. U. INT'L L. REV. 805, 828-32
(1999).
232. See Charney, supra note 4, at 463; Rodriguez, supra note 231. at 831-32.
233. See Kirsch and Holmes, supra note 214, at 4. The United Kingdom joined
this group after the election of the Labour government. Id.
234. See id. The permanent members are the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. Id.
235. See id. This group included India, Mexico, and Egypt. Id. The conference
debated a list of weapons to be banned that included chemical and biological weapons,
but reached no agreement and codified no such provision. See id. at 7-8.
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Once the Conference began, it became apparent that a large
number of countries favored a prosecutor independent of the Security
Council and free to pursue investigations and indictments at
discretion. 236 Therefore, the statute creates broad preconditions to
the exercise of the ICC's jurisdiction by requiring that "one or more"
of the states involved has accepted jurisdiction and is the territory on
which the conduct occurred, or the state of which the accused is a
national. 23 7 In short, a nation that has not ratified the treaty may
still find its nationals under investigation and international
indictment. 238
Moreover, the statute sets three relatively easy
triggers for the exercise of jurisdiction: (1) referral to the prosecutor
by a state party, (2) referral to the prosecutor by the Security Council,
and (3) the prosecutor's discretion. 239 Having created as broad a
jurisdiction over the four enumerated crimes and an independent
office of prosecutor, the statute allows a state to opt out from granting
jurisdiction over war crimes for the limited period of seven years
commencing from the date of ratification. 240 No other reservations
241
are allowed.
Pivotal to any court, but less controversial at the Rome
Conference than subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, are the
rules of procedure and evidence. The statute, having its own text as
governing law, avoids the ex post facto and nulla crimen sine lege
questions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. 242 Like the ICTY
and ICTR, the ICC may protect its victims by conducting proceedings
in camera or by electronic means. 243 Likewise, the Trial Chamber
has three judges and the Appeals Chamber five, with decision by
majority vote. 24 4
Consistent with international tribunals since
Nuremberg, the ICC follows European civil law rules on the
admissibility of evidence, "taking into account, inter alia, the
probative value of the evidence and any prejudice" that such evidence

236.
See id. at 8.
237.
Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 12.
238.
See Rodriguez, supra note 231, at 834-35.
239.
Rome Statute, supra note 8, arts. 13, 15. Article 15 authorizes the
prosecutor to "initiate investigations proprio motu," that is, on the prosecutor's
initiative. Id. art. 15, para. 1. Under Article 42 the prosecutor is elected by secrot
ballot by "an absolute majority of the members of the Assembly of States Parties," as
are the deputy prosecutors. Id. art. 42, para. 4. A prosecutor or deputy prosecutor can
be removed under Article 46 only by the same method. Id. art. 46, para. 2(b).
240.
Kirsch & Holmes, supra note 214, at 10-11; Rome Statute, supra note 8,
art. 124.
241.
Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 12.
242.
Id. arts. 22-24.
243.
Id. art. 68, para. 2.
Use of undisclosed witnesses undermined the
credibility of the ICTY during the Tadic trial. See SCHARF, supra note 50, at 212-13.
244.
Rome Statute, supra note 8, art. 39.

20011

EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS

437

may cause to a fair trial.2 5 Besides these divergences from AngloAmerican common law, the statute allows the prosecutor as well as
the defendant to appeal a verdict.246 Other rules of procedure and
evidence are voted upon or amended by a two-third majority of the
247
Assembly of States.
IV. PREDICTING THE ICC's EFFECTIVENESS AND LMPROVING
THE ROME STATUTE
A. Factorsthat Predict an InternationalCriminal
Tribunal'sEffectiveness
Volumes have been written about the meanings of the precedents
of Nuremberg, but for the purposes of this note, the principles of
Nuremberg to be enforced by the ICC include individual criminal
accountability under international law for war crimes, crimes against
humanity, aggressive war, and genocide, even if the individual acted
upon the orders of his superiors, or merely failed to act in his official
Unfortunately, the historical
capacity to stop the crime.2 48
circumstances of Nuremberg are not likely to be repeated in a case
involving the ICC. Nuremberg was unique, and the factors that
allowed for the success of the Nuremberg Tribunal as a court of law,
an international precedent, and a means of healing differ with every
international trial. Nonetheless, these factors can form a predictive
model for the effectiveness of an international criminal court. The
factors that determine the effectiveness of an international criminal
court include: (1) the degree of physical control exercised by the
enforcing powers; (2) the degree of cooperation among the enforcing
allies, neighboring countries, and interested parties; and (3) the
perceived integrity of the tribunal's procedures. 249 These factors will
control the effectiveness of any action taken by the ICC prosecutor.
1. Degree of Physical Control Over the Jurisdiction and the
Defendants
The first factor, the degree of physical control, is often related to
the severity of a state's defeat in war and is well-illustrated by the

245.
Id. art. 69, para. 4.
246.
Id. art. 81.
247.
Id. art. 51, para. 2. The Assembly of States consists of the nations that
have ratified the statute. See id. art. 2.
248.
See Timothy Wu & Yong-Sung (Jonathan) Kang, Criminal Liabillty For the
Actions of Subordinates-The Doctrine of Conmnmand Responsibility and Its Analogues
in United States Law, 38 HARV. INTL L. J. 272, 274-76 (1997).
249
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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2 50
four international tribunals since the Second World War.
Beginning with Nuremberg, the defeat of the Nazis in 1945 was total;
the German army was shattered on the battlefield. The joint
occupation of the Allied powers was not resisted after the surrender,
and Allied control of the sea prevented escape for all but a few of the
leading Nazis. 25 1 Moreover, German morale was so low that Allied
forces soon became more concerned with feeding the civilians than
with a possible resumption of armed hostilities. 252 If the Germans
continued to hate their captors, their hatred was largely impotent,
and the Nuremberg Tribunal obtained personal jurisdiction over most
of the leading Nazis, at least over those who did not commit
253
suicide.
In the Far East, however, the Allied Powers did not break the
Japanese will to fight without the consent and national radio
broadcast of the Emperor. Despite millions of casualties from battles,
disease, malnutrition, fire-bombing, and two atomic bombs, the
Japanese preferred to fight until they fell. The war cult of the
Emperor could only be broken by the Emperor, and MacArthur and
Truman, rather than risk prolonged hostilities and chaos that could
be exploited by the Russians, accepted the Japanese surrender on the
condition that the Emperor remain head of state. 254 The Japanese
capitulated on August 15, 1945, but Allied troops did not arrive for
two full weeks. 255 Despite repeated requests by other Allied powers
that the Emperor be tried as a war criminal, MacArthur and Truman
agreed that the expediency of preserving the reign of the Emperor
outweighed the risks of the resumption of hostilities with a suicidal
enemy on his native islands. 256 The cult of the Emperor, undermined
and amended but not broken, prevented the Allied Powers from
obtaining the same degree of physical control over Japan that they
had over Germany.
Forty-five years later, the United Nations Security Council
created the ICTY without exercising physical control, 257 or at least
obtaining regional cooperation, over most of its territorial jurisdiction
and defendants. The criticism of the ICTY since its inception has
been its inability to arrest and try those most responsible for the war

250
251.
252.
253
254.
255.
256.

See id.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 27, at 406.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
SPECTOR, supranote 21, at 546-47.
BRACKMAN, supra note 12, at 39-40.
See id. at 78.

257.
See Mark S. Martins, "War Crimes" During Operations Other Than War:
Military Doctrine and Law Fifty Years After Nuremberg, 149 MIL. L. REV. 145, 160
(1995).
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and atrocities in the Balkans. 258 The ICTY's first trial involved a
Bosnian Serb foolish enough to immigrate to Germany and get
arrested by local police. 25 9 Although the ICTY has convicted several
higher officers since the Tadic trial, the lack of physical control by
soldiers under the authority of NATO or the United Nations hinders
its mission severely. Most conspicuously, indicted officers of both the
federal government of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serb government
continue to flaunt the ICTY's weakness by making public
appearances, sometimes within sight of United Nations or NATO
troops.

260

In Rwanda, the Tutsi-led Rwandan Unity Government replaced
the genocidal regime of Hutu extremists after a brief war whose
casualties pale in number to those of the genocide. 2 1 The nation
remains physically exhausted and morally devastated from the
carnage, and many of the leading Hutu extremists have fled the
country. 262 There is no foreign occupation, only a relatively small
number of United Nations peace-keeping troops.2 63 Therefore, the
ICTR depends largely on the cooperation of the Rwandan Unity
Government, Rwanda's neighbors, and other countries to enforce
service of its criminal indictments.
2. Degree of Cooperation Among the Enforcing Powers
The most crucial factor in most cases that will come before the
ICC will be the degree of cooperation among the enforcing powers
because unconditional surrender followed by prolonged and intensive
foreign occupation is rare. Unfortunately for the ICC, international
cooperation will vary according to the case and the nations involved.
Geography, history, domestic politics, traditional alliances, and
conflicts of interests mean that the ICC will sometimes be powerless
to investigate or to serve its indictments.
Nuremberg, for instance, was the last major cooperative
international effort involving both the United States and Russia until
the crest of detente during the 1970s. 264 The joint prosecution to
punish the Nazis ended less than three years before the Berlin Airlift
began in the wake of growing Cold War tensions.265 During this brief
opportunity, Justice Jackson seized the moment to establish

258.
See SCHARF, supranote 50, at 222-24.
259.
See Brenda J. Hollis, The Thomas P. Kcenan Memorial Lecture: The
InternationalCriminalTribunal for Yugoslavia, 39 A.F. L. REV. 37, 38 (1996).
260.
SCHARF, supra note 50, at 224-25.
261. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 165, at 58, 71 n.356.
262.
Id. at 58, 703.
263.
See generally id. at 637-660.
264
See generally MICHAEL B. FROMAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF
DtTENTE (1991).

265.

MCCULLOUGH, supranote 27, at 630-31.
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precedents in international law that have seldom been matched. 266
The precedent for an international tribunal to prosecute aggressive
war and other crimes at Nuremberg was only possible because the
Russians, the British, and the French were just as committed to
punishing the Nazis as the United States.
Moreover, these same German Nazis were not useful to any of
the Big Four. While the Big Four disagreed on how to characterize
the crimes of the Nazis and on the methods of bringing justice to the
Nazis, they agreed that the Nazi leaders were criminals who should
26 7
be punished and that German military power must be neutralized.
If sparing one or several of the Nazis, say Herrmann Goering, would
have given political advantage to any one of the Big Four powers, it is
probable that the Nuremberg trials would not have had such
conclusive results. 268 Germany is a powerful and strategically located
nation. In 1945 the Big Four agreed on the joint occupation of
Germany and the systematic destruction of Nazi power. 269 By 1949
the cooperation of the Nuremberg Tribunal would have been
2 70
impossible.
It should not be forgotten that there would have been no
Nuremberg trials if the United States had persisted in its demand for
an independent prosecutor with powers to investigate and indict
Allied as well as Axis leaders and combatants. Under the London
Agreement, the Americans, British, French, and Russians cooperated
to prosecute only one type of defendant: their Axis enemies. 271 In
contrast, the ICC by statute is not limited to specific years, particular
places, and designated nationalities. 272 Nations that have fought
bitter wars in streets and deserts and over mountains and oceans

266.
TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 634.
267.
See id. at 634-35.
268.
See Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Armenian Genocide and the Legal and
PoliticalIssues in the Failureto Prevent or to Punish the Crime, 29 UWLA. L. REV. 43,

77. In comparing the failure to prosecute the Armenian genocide of the First World
War with the success of the prosecution at Nuremberg, Dadrian says: "In Nuremburg,
the decisive factor in the quest for such justice was the functional effectiveness of a
modicum of a unison among the victors vis-A-vis a vanquished enemy. It was that
unison which overwhelmed all other subsidiary issues including the issue of national
sovereignty." Id.
269
TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 639.
270
As noted above, in 1948 the Soviet Union set a blockade around Berlin,
necessitating the Berlin Airlift by the United States. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 27, at
630-31.
271.
LUCAS, supra note 35, at 227-230. As the German armies collapsed,
military discipline within the Allied armies broke down, and soldiers of the victorious
powers committed atrocities, including rape, theft, and even murder. See id. If the
Rome Statute had been in force, the ICC prosecutor would have had discretion to
investigate six years of Allied military operations and possible aggressive intent in
Allied diplomacy. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 8.
272.
Rome Statute, supra note 8, arts. 104, 111.
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will, however, be quite reluctant to open their military and diplomatic
records to international scrutiny.
In the Far East, the Allied Powers cooperated in the arrests of
leading Japanese officers, but the American political decision to spare
the Emperor from prosecution incited lasting dissent among the
eleven powers that participated in the Tokyo Tribunal. 273 With
eleven powers participating rather than just four, the voice of the
Tokyo Tribunal was bound to be more discordant than that of
Nuremberg.2 7 4 The discord did not necessarily affect the outcomes of
the trials, but rather, the dissent among the Allies seriously
undermined the credibility of the Tokyo Tribunal. 275 It seemed less a
court of law rather than carrier of the victors' vengeance and political
expediency. In the Far East, the United States needed to settle
scores quickly if unevenly in order to stabilize Japan, avoid a suicidal
guerrilla war on the home islands, and prevent further communist
expansion into Asia. 276 United States policy prevailed over the
sometimes contrary and dissenting voices of the Allies. 2 7 7 There was

also a historical irony that undermined the credibility of the Tokyo
Tribunal; several of the Allied powers on the Tokyo Tribunal had
acquired their Asian interests through aggressive war, if not by also
committing crimes against humanity and war crimes,
and would
2 78
attempt to continue their colonial policies after the war.
For the ICTY, international cooperation has not been a given,
even to the extent found at the Tokyo Tribunal. So long as there is
stalemate in the Balkans, whether peaceful or bloody, national
loyalties and diplomatic expediency will hinder, if not prevent, the
completion of the ICTY's mission.2 79 The planners of the bloodshed in
Belgrade and the most murderous of the Bosnian Serbs and Serb
Kosovars would likely be protected by either their governments or the
mountainous terrain and sympathetic locals.
Meanwhile, the

273.
BRACIZIAN, supra note 12, at 78. 387.90.
274.
See supranotes 66, 88-92 and accompanying text.
275.
MINEAR, supranote 77, at 90-91.
276.
SPECTOR, supranote 21, at 556.
277.
BRACKMAN, supranote 12, at 78.
278.
The United States granted independence to the Philippines in 1947, but
held on to many Pacific islands as new possessions. See generaly LARRY COLLINGS &
DOMINIQUE LAPIERRE, FREEDOM AT MIDNIGHT (1995).
Great Britain granted
independence to India in 1947. The Netherlands and the French lost guerrilla wars in
an effort to keep possession of Indonesia and Vietnam respectively. PAUL JOHNSON,
MODERN TIMES:

THE WORLD FROM THE TWENTIES TO THE EIGHTIES 477-80 (1983);

STANLEY KARNOW, VIETMAN: A HISTORY (1991) 209-14. Russia had fought with Japan
over northern Manchuria, Korea, and Sakhalin Island for decades. See generally JOHN
ALBERT WHITE, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (1964); TSUYOSHI
HASEGAWA, THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES DISPUTE AND RUSSO-JAPANESE RELTIONS,

1697-1985 (1998).
279.
See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
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Security Council powers generally cannot agree on a Balkan policy
because of traditional alliances in the region. 28 0 Russia is the ancient
ally of Orthodox Serbia in conflicts with both Catholic and Muslim
countries, 281 therefore an invasion of Serbia by NATO forces would
have lasting and potentially dangerous repercussions.
Russia's
support for Serbia, combined with Germany's traditional support for
Croatia and America's reluctance to risk military casualties mean
that the stalemate will likely last for years, with or without Milosevic.
Milosevic and his henchmen had no incentive to resign or retire,
much less surrender to NATO or UN authorities because of the ICTY
indictments for war crimes. Now that Milosevic is out of power, the
ICTY still relies on the new regime in Belgrade to extradite those
indicted, or hope that Milosevic and others will either give themselves
up or go where NATO soldiers or UN peace-keepers can and will
serve warrants. That the ICTY has had any success at all is a tribute
to those who have worked tirelessly and creatively to make it a
working trial court and to the gradual escalation of NATO
involvement on the ground and in the air.
The ICTR has not had as extensive a problem serving its
warrants as the ICTY.
First, Rwanda suffered not war, but
government-sponsored genocide and is not partitioned by political
factions. 2 82 Secondly, Rwanda is not the flashpoint for competing
283
world powers, as is Yugoslavia.
3. The Perceived Integrity of the Tribunal and Its Procedures
The perception of the justice administered by an international
criminal tribunal is just as important to the court's credibility as the
verdict in any single case. "Justice must not only be done but also be
seen to be done." 28 4 In this way, an international tribunal is less a
court of law than an instrument of public outrage tempered by
whatever sense of fairness remains. Justice Jackson captured this
challenge of history in his opening statement:
We must never forget that the record on which we judge these
defendants today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow
....
We must summon such detachment and intellectual integrity to
our task that this Trial will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling
285
humanity's aspirations to do justice.

280.
See generally MARK ALMOND, EUROPE'S BACKYARD WAR:
BALKANS (1994).

281.
282
283.

See id. at 308-16.
MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 165, at 704.
For a geographical description of Rwanda, see GERARD PRUNIER, THE

RWANDAN CRISIS: HISTORY OF GENOCIDE 1-4 (1995).

284.
285.

THE WAR IN THE

Bass, supra note 19, at 2112.
Statement by Robert Jackson, supra note 230, at 101.
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Nuremberg, more specifically Justice Jackson's opening
statement, remain the pinnacle moment in international criminal law
because of the lasting perception that justice was done. 286 The
Nuremberg lawyers and judges made mistakes, and the convictions
on some counts are questionable. 28 7 Nonetheless, the weight of the
documentary evidence combined with Justice Jackson's eloquence
and integrity created credibility not carried by any international
tribunal since. 288 For any international criminal court, the challenge
is to appear to be noble people fighting the crimes of the wicked, but
it is just as easy to appear to be bitter and vengeful people dwarfed by
the heinous acts of the wicked.
In any jurisdiction litigating issues of first impression, there is
the need to balance the demands of public policy with existing law,
and sometimes even to defer to natural law. 28 9 Indeed, in a
theoretical sense, the three-way conflict of legal realism, legal
positivism, and natural law is present in any case of first
impression. 2 90 An international criminal tribunal often must go
where the law has never been. At Nuremberg, the Big Four powers

286. See TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 167.
287. Id. at 631-32.
288.
See Henry T. King & Theodore C. Theofrastous, From Nuremberg to Rome:
A Step Backward for U.S. Foreign Policy, 31 CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 47, 49-50 (1999).
289. "Natural law" here is used in the sense that law does not exist in a moral
vacuum, and that law is not simply what the strong say it is. See PLTO, THE
REPUBLIC, I. 338 (Benjamin Jowett trans. 1991) (Thrasymachus argues to Socrates: -1
proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger." Socrates'
rebuttal constitutes the rest of the work.) In this sense, genocide iswrong not only
because public policy at the moment disfavors it and statute prohibits it, but also
because it is presumable that reasonable people should reach tils conclusion naturally.
Charney, supra note 4, at 453 (referring to "the law's natural.justice goals");
BRAcIMAN, supra note 12, at 224; see also Russell Kirk, Natural Law and the
Constitution of the United States, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035. 1036 (1994)
("Objectively speaking, natural law, as a term of politics and jurisprudence. may be
defined as a loosely-knit body of rules of action prescribed by an authority superior to
the state. These rules (according to several different schools of natural law and natural
rights speculation) are derived from divine commandment, from right reason with
which man is endowed by his Creator, from the nature of mankind empirically
regarded, from the abstract Reason of the Enlightenment, or from the long experience
of humankind in community").
290.
"Legal realism" here refers to the critique that judges "actually decide
cases" not by adherence to doctrine but "according to their own political or moral
tastes, then choose an appropriate legal rule as a rationalization." RONALD DWORKIN.
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi, 3 (1977). "Legal positivism," according to Dworkin,
"rejects the idea that legal rights can pre-exist any form of legislation." Id. Legal
realists and legal positivists often deny the existence of natural law. See also Andrews.
supra note 90 at 481 (explaining that international law is a product of natural law, but
that current attempts to create international courts with coercive powers is an
acceptance of Justinian, or legal positivist, principles into an area of law that has
always rejected legal positivist principles).
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appear to have pushed beyond the limits of positive law and regular
procedures without offending decency and justice.
At Tokyo, in contrast, the tribunal failed to match the credibility
of Nuremberg, and this failure illustrates one of the pitfalls of an
international tribunal. At Tokyo, the prosecution pushed the rules of
evidence to the limit in order to convict Hirota and Kido of the crime
of aggressive war, and by the time the trial was complete, it was
obvious that the same evidence and testimony could also convict the
absent Emperor. 291 Hirota was executed and Kido was sentenced to
life in prison, but the Emperor remained above the law.
Perhaps a chief prosecutor of greater stature and eloquence could
have overcome the general feeling that the Tokyo tribunal was a tool
for political expediency. Joseph Keenan was a seasoned politician
and capable litigator, but he was no Robert Jackson.2 92 Once the
Supreme Commander declared the Emperor off-limits of the
Tribunal, Keenan's hands were tied on the most critical war crimes
issue. He did his best, but could not avoid the impression of being the
293
instrument of revenge.
The ICTY's credibility falters mostly by the defendants it fails to
arrest, but perhaps its second worst credibility problem is its lack of
speed. At Nuremberg, the prosecution presented most of its case by
submitting documents. 294 The defense witnesses consumed most of
295
the trial time, but the documents were damning and conclusive.
The ICTY, in contrast, must prosecute most cases using dozens of
witnesses and relatively few documents. 296 The defense counters
with multiple witnesses. 297 The trials are often lengthy, and the
defendants must then wait months for a judgment. 298 In contrast, at
both Nuremberg and Tokyo, the defendants were tried together and
the sentences were issued on the same day. 299 The effect was far
more dramatic.
Thirdly, even some of the ICTY's most enthusiastic advocates
admit that its dependence on conflicting testimony undermines the
credibility of its verdicts. 30 0 The civil law rules of evidence are broad,
the rationale being that judges trained in the law, unlike common law
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MINEAR, supra note 77, at 115.

292.
See BRAcKMAN, supra note 12, at 54-55.
293.
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Nuremberg and also on the many trials of Japanese war criminals held in the
Philippines and other countries, most famously, the trial of General Yamashita. See id.
at 223-24.
294.
TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 172-76.
295.
See supranote 42 and accompanying text.
296.
See SCHARF, supra note 50, at 117.
297.
See id. at 176.
298.
See id. at 176-77.
299.
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300.
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juries, can weigh evidence on the whole, even hearsay evidence, and
weigh it justly. 30 1 The impression in common law countries, however,
is that the rights of the accused are violated by the evidentiary
rules.3 0 2 Many of the convictions and sentences would not have been
30 3
obtained under common law procedures.
Fourthly, because the ICTY cannot usually serve its indictments,
the prosecutor's discretion comes under frequent criticism-Richard
Goldstone's choice to prosecute Tadic, an underling, as the ICTY's
first trial, and Louise Arbour's decision to announce the indictment of
Milosevic during the NATO bombing campaign of 1999.301
The ICTR may seem more successful than the ICTY because it
has already convicted some of the major players in the Rwandan
Moreover, the
genocide, namely Kambanda and Akayesu. 30 5
conviction of Akayesu on a genocide charge was unprecedented in an
Nonetheless, any credibility of the ICTR
international court.
superior to the ICTY is mainly due to the ICTR's ability to gain
306
jurisdiction over those it indicts.
Rwanda is, however, remote and strategically unimportant and
so will never receive the sort of attention given the Nazis at
Nuremberg. The nations of the Security Council did not fire a shot in
anger while the Hutus massacred the Tutsis, and arguably, the
Security Council only created the ICTR, and for that matter, the
ICTY, to save face after its inaction and apparent impotence. The
remote location of Rwanda and its Tribunal contribute to the
credibility problems. Arusha, Tanzania, site of the ICTR, is more
than 400 miles (640 kilometers) from Kigali, the capital of Rwanda,
and even farther away from the world's media centers. The distance

301. MINEAR, supra note 77, at 119.
302.
See generally Rod Dixon, ProsecutingInternationalCrimes. An Inside View:
Developing InternationalRules of Evidence for the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, 7
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMPT. PROBS. 81 (1997).
303. See, e.g., Sienho Yee, The Erdemovic Sentencing Judgment. A Questionable
Milestone for the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 26 GA. J.
INT'L & CAMP. L. 263 (1997); see also RICHARD GOLDbTONE,
REFLECTIONS OF A VAR CRIMES INJESTIGATOR 89 (2000).
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For instance, those captured and indicted tend to prefer French and Canadian
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Christine Poulon & Mair McCafferty, News From the International War Crimes
Tribunals, 6 HUMI. RTS. Bi 23 (1999). The announcement provoked a hunger strike
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306.
See Rewards Offered for Leads About Rwandan Fugitwe. WASH. POST. Jan. 5.
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is so great that most of the world and even some of the survivors of
the genocide may not know that trials are pending. In contrast, the
Nuremberg trials commanded the world's attention and took place in
a city famous for its Nazi activities. Moreover, the Allies "went to
considerable lengths to explain to the German public exactly what the
Nazi leadership stood accused of."' 30 7 The ICTR should not be blamed
for the fact that many people around the world, and perhaps even in
Rwanda, are not aware of its existence. The point here is that
international publicity is a major factor in the credibility of an
international court, not only as a legitimate instrument of the rule of
law, but also as a deterrent to similar crimes.
Moreover, the ICTR can only try a fraction of the criminals.
More than 140,000 are in custody for crimes against the Tutsis, a
number a poor country can hardly sustain in its court systems or
jails. 30 8 In many ways, the tragedy of Rwanda dwarfs any legal
remedy: "A perfect genocide-in which the rule of law has not been
violated, because murder was the law-shatters the logic of criminal
'30 9
justice by redefining deviance.
B. Predictingthe ICC's Effectiveness
Historically, these three predictive factors, the degree of control
by the enforcing powers, the degree of cooperation among the
interested powers, and the integrity and credibility of the court,
determine the general success of an international criminal tribunal.
These factors are likely to determine the success of the ICC in a given
conflict and as a deterrent. Perhaps the ICC has the potential to
develop the sort of precedent and legitimacy that might deter
violations of human rights, and its status as a permanent court will
eliminate the long lag times needed to establish ad hoc tribunals.
Nonetheless, its effectiveness will be case-specific and based on the
above factors.
1. Three Recent Conflicts: Three Hypotheticals of the ICC's
Effectiveness
Using recent human rights violations as hypotheticals, the ICC
can expect mix results. For instance, if the ICC had been in place in
1990 it probably would have served the situation in Rwanda better

307.

Poulon & McCafferty, supra note 305, at 23; see also RICHARD L. MERRITT,
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151 (1995). The Americans distributed literature, filmed documentaries, broadcast on
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than the ICTR because the first trials would have taken place two to
three years earlier.3 10 A permanent ICC would have improved upon
the lagging speed of the ICTY trials as well. 311 Nonetheless, crimes
such as those committed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Kuwait, and
Israel are probably beyond a judicial remedy. Crimes committed by a
Security Council power such as China are most likely untouchable by
3 12
the ICC or any other court.

The greatest challenge for the ICTR was that the swiftness of the
violence and the sheer numbers of killers and killed created legions of
criminal defendants. After genocidal bloodshed, the rebuilding of a
country requires a rapid international response, and if the ICC had
been in place, it could have spared the Rwandans months of waiting
for the negotiations of the jurisdiction of the ICTR and the first trials.
The ICC and the Rwandan Unity Government could have negotiated
and divided the vast caseload according to urgency and magnitude.
While the genocide was still news, the ICC could have been issuing
warrants and serving indictments. The Rwandan Unity Government
could have immediately shipped out the leading suspects to the ICC
sitting at the Hague. Especially for the most notorious planners and
implementers of the genocide, the ICC would have been a suitable
forum and may have commanded the world's attention.
Cooperation with international authorities is less of a problem in
Rwanda than in Yugoslavia, but some points of controversy remain.
Rwandan law in many cases under trial would issue a death
sentence, but neither the ICC nor the ICTR can do so under its
statute. Here the credibility of the ICC is key, because the Rwandans
would be more likely to trust the ICC's justice, even if it were not as
harsh, if it were swift. Nonetheless, the ICC will not be seen as a
credible court in many cultures if it will not take "an eye for an eye."
Perhaps the ICC would be most effective in a situation such as
Rwanda's. Rwanda is a weak nation remote from the world's great
powers and has little strategic importance. Rwanda suffered a
sudden outbreak of violence from within that shattered its own
government and courts. The genocidal regime collapsed suddenly,
and the new coalition is too weak to punish all the criminals and
rebuild the country. Here the ICC, if properly led on the bench and in
the office of prosecutor, may fulfill its promise and mandate because
there would be little challenge to its physical control of the suspects,
adequate international cooperation, and the stature necessary to gain
the attention and respect of the world.
In the case of Yugoslavia, however, it is questionable if the ICC
would have improved on the work of the ICTY in any way other than
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the length of the trials held. It can be argued that if the ICC had
existed in 1991 it may have deterred Milosevic and the Yugoslav
federal government in Belgrade from launching an aggressive war to
prevent Croatian, Slovenian, and Bosnian secession. Nevertheless, it
is just as likely that the Serb nationalists would not have taken any
international authority seriously unless it were backed by assertive
ground forces of a major power. The unwillingness of the United
States to shed the blood of ground troops in the Balkans combined
with the fear that an U.S.-led invasion of Serbia would provoke
Russian intervention has thus far given the Serb nationalists relative
impunity. Thus, in the former Yugoslavia, the lack of physical control
over the territory of the conflict's main instigator severely hinders the
success and credibility of any international criminal tribunal,
whether the ICTY or the ICC.
Looking at a third hypothetical, Iraq and the Persian Gulf War,
the ICC's effectiveness would be limited at best. The United Nations
had the military power to drive all the way to Baghdad and seize
physical control of Iraq. 313 With physical control it would have been
possible to destroy Iraq's nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities,
prevent further violations of human rights, and arrest many of the
leading Iraqis as war criminals, possibly even President Hussein.
For a variety of political reasons, however, the United Nations
forces, led by the United States, limited their ground operations to
Kuwait and southern Iraq. The United States, wary of casualties,
balked at a deeper penetration of Iraq and subsequent occupation in
which U.S. soldiers would be exposed to terrorist attacks.
Meanwhile, Iraq's Arab neighbors, mostly Sunni Muslims, feared the
replacement of Hussein's party in Iraq by radical Shiite Muslims
allied with Iran more than they feared Hussein's continuance in
power. 3 14 As threatening and hostile as Hussein is, he was and is
useful to the powers that defeated him, even the United States and
Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the United States and the United Nations
alliance would rather stand by while Iraq bombs and gases the Kurds
and executes its dissenters than intervene in the name of human
rights. It is a terrible dilemma, a "Hobson's choice," but it illustrates
as well as any recent conflict that the enforcement of international
human rights will always be limited by the number of military
casualties a nation is willing to take in order to serve a warrant or
prevent a crime.

313.
See Peter Tsouras et al., The Ground War, in MILITARY LESSONS OF THE
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2. Predicting the ICC's Effectiveness as a Deterrent
The ICC's most enthusiastic proponents acknowledge that
political realities will often clash with the enforcement of human
rights law, but they argue that the ICC's existence as a permanent
institution will have meaningful deterring effects. 3 15 First, a nation's
leaders will now know that a court is in place to try them for human
rights violations. While an ad hoc tribunal has no mission beyond its
mandate, the ICC is a permanent institution and has power to
investigate, indict, and try violators of human rights without several
rounds of diplomacy. 3 16 Secondly, the ICC's advocates argue that
violators of human rights will now know that impunity behind
national boundaries cannot be assumed. While Nuremberg, Tokyo,
the ICTY, and the ICTR were rare exceptions to the principle of
national sovereignty, the jurisdiction of the ICC is very broad and
permanent. Thirdly, all nations, even major powers, will now more
assertively monitor their own military operations, police, and penal
institutions because of the possibility of the international
embarrassment of an ICC investigation and trial.
These are strong arguments, but they do not address the most
basic problem of the ICC: the ICC can only deter by its credibility as
an enforcer of human rights law, but its credibility is dependent upon
physical coercion and international cooperation as exercised by
powers that view the ICC's interests as their own. Two controversies
in the Rome Statute illustrate this basic problem:
the lack of
agreement on a definition of the crime of aggressive war, and the
independence of the office of prosecutor.
The leaders of only two nations have ever been convicted, at least
in modern times, of the crime of aggressive war: Germany and
Japan. 317 Of all the defendants at Nuremberg and Tokyo, only five
were convicted of the crime of aggressive war alone, and not one of
those five was executed. 318 While the American prosecutors at
Nuremberg worked diligently and conscientiously to develop criminal
liability for launching an aggressive war, they were unable to win
over the French, the British, the Russians, or the United States
Supreme Court.319 It is problematic if not impossible to divorce

315. Charney, supranote 4,at 461-62.
316. Id. at 460.
317.
See discussions supraPart II.A.
318. TAYLOR, supranote 10, at 587-95; BRACM.AN, supra note 12, at 379.
319. ROGER K. NE\vWAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 340 (1994). Justice Black
believed that the Nuremberg and Tokyo defendants were being tried for ex post facto
crimes: "Ifyou want to punish people like that, take them out and shoot them." Id.
Later he wrote, "One of the most evil effects of the affair was, I think, that it diluted
the general meaning of'judicial proceeding." Id.

450

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:405

aggression from war because in war the best defense is often a good
offense.320
The Nuremberg and Tokyo charters very deliberately allowed
prosecution only against members of the Axis powers. Without such
a restriction, the Allied Powers would have had plenty of aggressive
wars to prosecute among themselves-the Russian invasions of
Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states in 1939-40, the American
subjugation of the Philippines long before the Japanese attack;32 1 and
32 2
centuries of French, Dutch, and British imperialism.
This recitation of wrongs is not an attempt to place the Allies on
the same moral plane as the Nazis or to cast blame; it is to illustrate
that the worst results of the public policies of the world's most
powerful nations are generally beyond public litigation. "Litigation is
not an ideal form of social action. ''323 Nuremberg, despite its success
as precedent, was brought into being by fifty million deaths and the
unconditional surrender of Germany to the most powerful alliance
ever forged by a fight against evil. Stalin, Churchill, and Truman did
not lead their nations to victory over the Nazis in order to surrender
themselves, their advisors, and their soldiers to an international
tribunal for war crimes.
Aggressive war, despite the pleadings of Justice Jackson, may be
a crime beyond a judicial remedy. The Rome Conference could not
define it 324 without implicating the foreign policies of the world's
great powers and many of the lesser ones. Moreover, to define the
crime of aggressive war is to impugn the legitimate borders of the
very powers called to enforce human rights law around the world.
What great power has not expanded its borders through aggressive
war? For this reason, the ICC statute may not ever define aggressive
war, and if it does, the ICC prosecutor will be forced to make a

320.
See James P. Lucier, Just What Is a War Criminal?, INSIGHT ON NEWS,
Aug. 2, 1999, at 13. John Bolton, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, stated:
It is a big mistake for us to grant any validity to international law even when it
may seem in our short-term interest to do so-because, over the long term, the
goal of those who think that international law really means anything are those
who want to constrict the United States. We ought to be concerned about this
so-called right to humanitarian intervention-a right of intervention that is
just a gleam in one beholder's eye but looks like flat-out aggression to somebocy
else.
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political judgment on whether to pursue this issue after every
conflict.
The lack of checks on the ICC prosecutor's jurisdiction and
discretion as well as the uncertainties regarding the definitions of
crimes, not only aggressive war, but also crimes against humanity3?
and war crimes, create opportunities for prosecutorial abuse. 3 2G State
prosecutors, as political as they may be, are accountable to the head
of state or delegated authority that appoints or elects them, as well as
to established laws and precedents. 327 Their prosecutions have
geographic and structural boundaries.
For instance, if the
prosecution of a foreign suspect might provoke a war, few
constitutions would allow the state prosecutor to press those charges
without express permission of the head of state or delegated
authority. The ICC prosecutor, however, has independent discretion
accountable mainly to the pretrial chamber. 328 The ICC prosecutor is
elected or removed by the majority vote of the states party to the
Rome Statute; the power of the pretrial chamber and the threat of
removal are the main structural checks upon the prosecutor's
329
discretion.
The office of ICC prosecutor is analogous in some ways to the
United States office of independent counsel, but the ICC prosecutor's
mandated powers are broader. 330 While the office of independent
counsel only has powers to disrupt and undermine the executive
branch of the United States, the office of ICC prosecutor can indict
several heads of state at once. 3 31 The American office of independent
counsel is ad hoc and granted a specific mandate by a special division
of judges. 332 The ICC prosecutor is permanent and broadly mandated
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by the Rome Statute to investigate any allegation of aggressive war,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide that involves a
national of or the territory of a state party to the statute.333 From the
experience of the ICTY, it is unlikely that the ICC prosecutor can
persuade all nations to cooperate with his or her investigations.
Nonetheless, there are no other checks on the ICC prosecutor's
334
powers, the threat of dismissal notwithstanding.
The ICC is a permanent institution intended to push the
frontiers of international law. If the ICC were an ad hoc tribunal,
then the flaws in the statute might not undermine its limited
purpose. The majority of nations at the Rome Conference voted to
make the ICC prosecutor independent of the Security Council, 335 but
'336
the purpose of the ICC is not "to make us feel good, but to succeed.
As a matter of function, the ICC prosecutor will often not be able to
exercise jurisdiction over a criminal suspect without the cooperation
and support of the most powerful members of the Security Council.
While the majority of the nations at the Rome Conference historically
had reason to distrust the Security Council's ability to pursue justice
dispassionately and apolitically, 337 the Security Council's flaws do not
mean that the ICC prosecutor will not have to depend on the Security
Council. Without the Security Council's support, the ICC prosecutor
is less of a prosecutor and more of an international protester-at-large.
The hope of many at the Rome Conference was to create an office
of ICC prosecutor free from international power politics. 338 If Japan
can exact a condition for its own surrender after two atomic attacks,
however, then it appears that humanity will never govern itself in a
political vacuum. The "key obstacle" to an international criminal
court is that "its activities could touch on highly political interests
over which some states are not willing to relinquish control. '33 9 By
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separating the office of ICC prosecutor from the powers that control
most of the world's military transport, modern aircraft and ships,
armored vehicles, and combat-ready infantry, the Rome Conference
may have created an independent office, but not necessarily an
effective one. The ICC prosecutor will be under constant pressure to
chastise and embarrass the strong countries-indicting members of
the Chinese politburo for their persecution of Tibetans or
investigating American cruise missile launches against the Sudan.3"0
Meanwhile, the ICC prosecutor must gain the trust and cooperation
of the same countries in order litigate criminal trials for human
rights violations. The ICC itself has no sabre to rattle.
V. CONCLUSION

As much as international lawyers might praise the ICC as
founded upon the principles of Nuremberg, those principles do not
guarantee effectiveness. In fact, in absence of similar circumstances,
they almost guarantee disappointing results. Nuremberg is not a
realistic model for future international criminal tribunals. Rarely in
history are three powerful allies and host of other nations united to
force the unconditional surrender of so formidable an enemy. Rarely
will that enemy collapse so utterly and completely, leaving thousands
of evidentiary documents by which to try the leaders for war crimes.
It is doubtful that in the postmodern era that a superpower such as
the United States could act decisively with the same balance of moral
confidence and legal realism.
The ICC can only be as effective as it is coercive, and it cannot be
coercive without the assertive cooperation of the military and police
forces operating in the vicinity of the jurisdiction it assumes. As the
meager and slow results of the ICTY show, international criminal law
cannot be effective so long as the conflicting peoples remain at war
and military forces protect their leaders from judicial service. The
victors in the Second World War were able to exact justice in
international criminal court against the leaders of an enemy that had
surrendered unconditionally, but that same criminal liability was not
imposed upon the victors themselves. Today, Russian cooperation
with an international court to investigate Russian atrocities
committed against Chechens is just as unthinkable as U.S. military
expedition to subdue the warring parties in that quarter. Likewise,
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Chinese atrocities against the Tibetans will never be prosecuted.
China is too powerful to be brought to its knees and too large to be
occupied. Tibet is too remote to benefit from any coercive powers the
ICC may muster.
It is just as unlikely that war criminals in the future will
deliberately create so convincing a paper trail. Most war crimes other
Nuremberg was
than genocide require little documentation.
successful in a large part because the documents, rather than the
testimony of witnesses, damned those indicted. The Nazis had few
opportunities to dispute witnesses' testimony; they were hanged by
the cold efficiency of their own meticulous record keeping. Their
documents silenced their propaganda. Seldom will the ICC prosecute
defendants so cooperative.
Politics is the art of the possible, and the development and
enforcement of international criminal law depends on the unified
political will and military power of the alliance that creates the
international tribunal. 341 The Nuremberg tribunal, and to a lesser
extent, the Tokyo tribunal, are generally looked upon as successful
instruments of justice and precedents for international criminal law,
and it is hoped now that the ICTY and ICTR will achieve similar
success. Courts, however, are only as credible as the powers that
enforce their judgments. In the cases of the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, the conditions that existed at Nuremberg are repeated in
part but not in whole. Therefore, the United Nations should be
prepared for more limited success. Likewise, the permanent ICC
under the Rome Statute of 1998 promises to build upon the successes
of the ICTY and ICTR, but it faces similar constraints. In most cases,
the ICC will be unable to secure control of territories and suspects
without the armed support of Security Council nations. Meanwhile,
its dependence on the cooperation of nations with conflicting
interests, will combine with a lack of structural accountability in the
prosecutor's office to undermine its effectiveness and credibility.
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